2

PHILEMON

TO

HYDASPES;

RELATING

A SECOND CONVERSATION with HORTENSIUS upon the Subject of FALSE RELIGION.

In which is asserted

The GENERAL LAWFULNESS of PLEASURE;

AND

The EXTRAVAGANT SEVERITIES of some Religious Systems are shewn to be a direct CONTRADICTION to the *Natural* Appointment and Constitution of Things.

Ἡδονης δε πασης μεν περιεχεσθαι, και παντως, αλογιστον εστι, πασαν δε φευγειν, και παντως, αναισθητον. *Plut.* con. sep. Sap. Ed. Xyl. p. 158.

THE SECOND EDITION.

LONDON:

Printed for M. STEEN, in the *Inner-Temple-Lane*.
M. DCC. XL.

(Price 1 *s.* 6 *d.*)

BRITISH MUSEUM

PHILEMON
TO
HYDASPES,
&c.

I SHOULD have imagin'd, my *Hydaſpes*, had I not known you to be very different from the generality of polite People, that you would have been ſufficiently tired with ſo *grave* a Topic as *Religion*, after the Recital I had made you of an intire Morning's Converſation carried on profeſſedly upon

that Subject. Men of Spirit and Vivacity can ſeldom reliſh any thing ſerious long together. A Reflection or two in paſſing is the moſt they are ordinarily willing to ſubmit to. I have often been inclin'd to think the *awkard Solemnity*, with which we are commonly taught Religion makes the thought of it ſo unpleaſant to us ever afterwards. Juſt as ſome People contract a Diſtaſte to *Letters* from *illiberal Impreſſions* of the Harſhneſs and Severity of *School-Diſcipline*. Could we but once free Religion from this *over-ſolemn Air*, and diſperſe the *falſe Gloom*, which our *Nurſeries* have thrown about it, we might poſſibly procure it a freer Reception, and more frequent, and familiar Entertainment in the World. It might then be no longer confined to the Receſſes of the Cloyſter, the Seats of Mopiſhneſs, Superſtition, and Bigotry; but be ſometimes permitted to make its appearance even in *good Company*; and be brought into ſome degree of Credit and Reputation amongſt the polite and faſhionable part of Mankind. It was thus, *Hydaſpes*, that I indeavor'd lately to introduce *Religion* to your Thoughts; in that *freer Air*, and more *liberal Manner*, in which ſhe had been pourtrayed to me by the excellent hand of *Hortenſius* *; a Man

* See a Pamphlet intitled *Phil.* to *Hyd.* Part I.

who,

who, as I have often repreſented him to you,

always ſpeaks his thought,
And always thinks the very thing he ought *.

It ſeems, you are ſo far from being diſpleaſed with the report of our Conference, that you have ingaged me to recollect any farther particulars that might afterwards paſs between us, in purſuance of the ſame Argument. For it could not be, you are of opinion, that a ſingle Morning ſhould have ſufficed me to have diſcuſſed ſo copious a Theme, and of which you know me to have ſo remarkable a Fondneſs.

YOUR Conjecture is not ill founded. Having gone ſo far into the Subject, I was not eaſily diſingag'd from it. I was ever and anon relapſing inſenſibly into the ſame train of Thought; purſuing and applying the Principles we had already eſtabliſhed; and could ſcarce converſe with any thing ſo intirely foreign to it, but ſerved in ſome way or other to renew the Impreſſion.

ONE Afternoon, as *Hortenſius* and I were taking the air on horſeback, What think you, (ſaid he) of our making a viſit to my Neighbour *Clito?* you will find him

* Mr. *Pope*'s ſecond Sat. of Hor. im. lin. 135.

a very ſenſible agreable man; I ſhall be glad to introduce you to his Acquaintance. Beſides, you will be much pleas'd with a ſight of his *Villa*; he has been at a conſiderable expence in the Improvement of it; in which he has ſhewn himſelf to be Maſter of a very polite and genteel Taſte. You are a ſort of *Connoiſſeur* this way, you will have an opportunity of paſſing your own Judgment upon it.

I could have no Objection (you will imagine) to ſo agreable a Propoſal. About an Hour's ride thro' a very pleaſant Country brought us thither. We were receiv'd by *Clito* with an eaſy Civility, the genuine reſult of true Politeneſs. *Hortenſius* would have excus'd the liberty of introducing an intire Stranger, but *Clito* would hear nothing of that ſort: You cannot (ſaid he) oblige me more, *Hortenſius*, than by bringing me into an acquaintance with any Friend of yours.

Our firſt Ceremonies being over, I ſoon took occaſion to ſay ſomething of the Agreableneſs of the Place and Situation, which was ſuch as to ſtrike one at firſt ſight. It was an Inſtance (I obſerved) of that good Taſte, which ſeemed indeed to diſcover itſelf on all hands, that *Clito* had made choice of ſo beautiful a Spot to build

on;

on; where, without being too much expoſed, he had the Command of ſo fine a Country.

I have often (ſaid he) been ſurpriſed, *Philemon*, conſidering how much depends upon a good Situation, to find ſo little regard had to this, where even a prodigal Expence ſeemed to have been imployed to make every thing elſe as complete as poſſible.

'Twas not (obſerved *Hortenſius*) in every body's power to command equal Advantages this way. Nature might be ſaid to have her *favorite* ſpots, to which ſhe was more than ordinarily liberal of her Bounties; and which did, as it were, *beſpeak* Improvement by leaving, if the Paradox might paſs, ſo little room for *any*.

Were one to judge (returned I) by the Practice of ſome People, who yet would not be thought to want Taſte, one would imagine the *reverſe* of this Rule was to take place. They pitch upon the moſt barren and deſolate Spots to build on, as if the Perfection of *Art* were to croſs *Nature*; and are at infinitely more Expence to make a bad Situation *tolerable*, than would anſwer to make a more advantageous one *delightful*.

IT is this Vanity of Expence, (replied *Hortenſius*) that puts People upon ſuch unnatural Projects.

POSSIBLY (ſaid *Clito*) they are of opinion, that they have more of the Merit of their Deſigns to *themſelves*, the leſs they are beholden for any Hints of them to *Nature*. To cultivate a bleak barren Scene, and give Beauties where Nature ſeems to have been more than ordinarily ſparing of them, they may eſteem a ſort of voluntary Creation, in which the force of the Artiſt's *own Genius* is at full liberty to diſplay itſelf: whereas in a more advantageous Situation, much of his work is done beforehand, and *Art* has little elſe to do but to aſſiſt *Nature*, to proceed upon thoſe Hints which ſhe ſuggeſts, and to follow where ſhe points out the way.

AND to do this with any *competent Effect*, (ſaid I) may ſufficiently exerciſe the Invention of the moſt ingenious Deſigner. Nay, I queſtion whether it be not in ſome Caſes a greater trial of Skill not to *deſtroy*, or *weaken* a *natural* Beauty, than it can be in others to *introduce* an *artificial* one. This I am very ſure of, that there is no hope of any conſiderable Succeſs, where *Nature* and *Art* do not go hand in hand.

Without

Without this, whatever other Beauties there may be, a main one will ſtill be wanting; a certain eaſy *Simplicity* of *Manner*, which *Nature* only can give.

'Tis this (interpoſed *Hortenſius*) that I have always thought the great Recommendation of my Friend *Clito*'s Method of deſigning. Here, *Philemon*, is none of that *ſtudied Regularity*, which diſpleaſes by a perpetual Sameneſs and Repetition of

Grove nods at Grove, each Ally has a Brother,
*And half the Platform juſt reflects the other**.

The poor reſult of a *confined* Taſte, and a *Littleneſs* of Deſign! But a certain *agreable Wildneſs* prevails thro' the whole, which as it reſembles *Nature* in its *Beauty*, reſembles it alſo in its *Uſe*, (a ſure mark that it is natural!) by ſuting itſelf to the unequal Temper of our Climate, and varying with all the Varieties of our Seaſons.

You are very obliging, (ſaid *Clito*) but take care that by raiſing your Friend's Expectations too high, *Hortenſius*, you do not prepare him to be more eminently diſappointed. Something, 'tis true, of the kind you have been deſcribing is attempted here in little, and indeed the Nature of our

* Mr. *Pope*'s Epiſt. to my Lord *Burlington*, 115.

Engliſh

Engliſh Climate, as you rightly obſerv'd, where a Man may often go to bed in *June*, and riſe in *December*, makes it not only agreable, but neceſſary. How well this purpoſe is really anſwer'd, *Philemon* will be beſt Judge for himſelf, if he will be at the trouble of looking a little about him.

WITH all my heart, (ſaid I) *Clito*, it will be a very particular Pleaſure to me. ——Accordingly, having firſt taken a view of the Houſe, in which a general Neatneſs, Uſefulneſs, and *elegant Simplicity*, ſeem'd to have taken place of *operoſe* Grandeur, and a Profuſion of *ſtudied* Ornaments and *incumber'd* Magnificence, we were conducted into the Gardens, where I ſoon found what *Hortenſius* had been ſaying of them, was much more than a Compliment. The Diſpoſition was eaſy and natural, ariſing wholly out of the Genius of the *Place*; and the ſeveral Beauties ſeem'd not ſo properly brought *into* it, as reſulting *from* it. The Interchanges of Shade and Opening, level and raiſed Ground, Garden and Foreſt, were adjuſted with great Art, ſo as beſt to *relieve* and ſet *off* each the other; and withal to take in or exclude the view of the Country about us, as either was judged moſt *agreable* in the general Plan. Whilſt the Eye was taken up with the various Forms of beautiful

Objects that preſented themſelves in their reſpective *Aſſignments*, ſuch as *Theatres*, *Temples*, *Statues*, *Urns*, *Obeliſks*, the other Senſes were as agreably entertained with the multiplied Fragrancies of natural Scents, the warbling Muſic of Birds, or the ſoothing Softneſs of aquatic Murmurs. In ſhort, *Hydaſpes*, I never ſaw a more delightful Scene. I was ſo much taken with it, that we paſſed the intire remainder of our Viſit in rambling there from place to place, 'till the Evening inſenſibly came upon us.

In our return home, *Philemon*, (ſaid *Hortenſius* to me) I hope you do not think we have diſpoſed of our Afternoon amiſs.

Far from it, (returned I) I never paſſed one more to my ſatisfaction. You know I am a great lover of all natural Improvements. *Clito* has really an excellent turn this way. You are very happy, *Hortenſius*, in ſo agreable a Neighbour. He is a Man of ſtrong Senſe, and a very polite and improved Converſation.

I have ſometimes thought, (replied he) *Philemon*, there is a ſort of natural Connexion between what is called a *fine Taſte* of the *politer Arts* of Life, and a general *Poliſhedneſs* of *Manners* and *inward Character*. Men of a refined Imagination have

 uſually

uſually a *larger* way of thinking than others. They diſcover a *Delicacy* of *Sentiment*, and *Generoſity* of *Spirit*, which leſs *improved* Minds are wholly ſtrangers to. Should it not ſeem, *Philemon*, that being perpetually converſant in the Ideas of *natural Beauty*, *Order*, and *Proportion*, their *Tempers* inſenſibly take a *Poliſh* from the Objects of their *Studies* and *Contemplations*? They tranſcribe, as it were, ſomething of that *Grace* and *Symmetry* they are ſo fond of in *external* Subjects into the *inward* Frame and Diſpoſition of their own Minds *.

THE

* As ſoon, ſays the Author of the Inquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, as a Heart, before hard and obdurate, is ſoftened in this Flame, (he is ſpeaking of Benevolence) we ſhall obſerve, ariſing along with it, a Love of *Poetry*, *Muſic*, the *Beauty* of *Nature* in rural Scenes, a neat *Dreſs*, a *humane* Deportment, a Delight in, and Emulation of every thing which is *gallant*, *generous*, and *friendly*. *Inquiry* p. 258. May not the reverſe of this Obſervation be equally true? This is certain, ſays an eminent Writer, that the Admiration and Love of *Order*, *Harmony*, and *Proportion*, in whatever kind, is naturally improving to the *Temper*, advantageous to ſocial Affection, and highly aſſiſtant to Virtue; which is itſelf no other than the Love of Order and Beauty in Society. *Characteriſtics*, vol. 2. p. 75.——Whoever, ſays another approved Author, find themſelves inſenſible to the Charms of Poetry and Muſic, would, I think, do well to keep their own Counſel; for fear of reproaching their own Temper, and bringing the Goodneſs of their Natures, if not of their Underſtandings, into queſtion. Sir *W. Temple*'s Miſcel. vol. 2. p.

THE *Virtuoſi*, (ſaid I) *Hortenſius*, are much obliged to you. I wiſh they were always careful to make good an Obſervation ſo much in their favour. I am afraid the *polite Arts* are ſometimes cultivated by Men, who have no great Taſte of *moral Accompliſhments*.

THEN they are by no means the *Virtuoſi* they would be eſteemed, (returned he.) No Man has a juſt Claim to this Character, in whom the *Virtuoſo-Paſſion*, the Love of *Beauty*, *Order*, *Proportion*, does not prevail *throughout*, and influence his *general*

p. 62.——Were we to extend this Obſervation even to the inferior Elegancies of Dreſs, as inſignificant a Particular as it may ſeem to ſome People, we ſhould not want a very good Authority in our favour; the polite and philoſophic Poet in his Epiſtle to *Mæcenas*, having given a ſufficient Sanction to this way of reaſoning.

Si curtatus inæquali tonſore capillos
Occurri, rides: ſi forte ſubucula pexæ
Trita ſubeſt tunicæ, vel ſi toga diſſidet impar,
Rides: quid mea cum pugnat ſententia ſecum?

Hor. Epiſt. lib. 1. Epiſt. 1. v. 94.——and upon the ſame Principle *Seneca* mentions it as a very ſtrong Proof of Depravity in certain effeminate Characters of his time, that they were offended at little Irregularities in the Oeconomy of their *Perſons* at the ſame time that they had no Senſe of much worſe Diſorders in real *Life* and *Manners*. Quomodo iraſcuntur, ſays he, ſi tonſor paullo negligentior fuit? quis eſt iſtorum, qui non malit rempublicam ſuam turbari, quam comam? qui non cõmptior eſſe malit, quam honeſtior? —*L. A. Sen.* de Brev. Vit. lib. p. 505, 506.

Conduct *. For let us consider, *Philemon*. Having once establish'd a *Correctness* of Taste and *Elegance* of Fancy in the Things of *outward* Grace and Ornament, shall we be such poor and scanty Thinkers, as to give it no scope in Subjects of a *nobler* kind? shall we be so little consistent with ourselves, as to be inamor'd of the *Harmony* of *Sounds*, and have no Sense of *inward Numbers*, the *Measures* of *Action*, the *nicer Tones* of *Passion* and *Sentiment* †? Being Masters of a

* 'Tis upon this Principle the noble Author before referred to says, He is persuaded that to be a *Virtuoso*, so far as befits a Gentleman, is a Step towards the becoming a Man of Virtue, and good Sense. *Charact.* vol. 1. 333. And again, 'Tis impossible we can advance the least in any Relish or Taste of outward Symmetry and Order, without acknowledging that the proportionate and regular State is the truly prosperous and natural in every Subject. Should not this, one would imagine, be still the same Case, and hold equally as to the Mind? Vol. 3. 180, 181. and elsewhere.

† ——*Non verba sequi fidibus modulanda Latinis:*
Sed veræ numerosque, modosque, ediscere vitæ.
Hor. Epist. Lib. 2. Epist. 2. v. 143.——Αι μυσαι (says *Mnesiphilus* in *Plutarch*) παντα πασιν ἡμας μεμψαιντο, ει νομιζομεν αυτων εργον ειναι κιθαραν και αυλες, αλλα μη το παιδευειν τα ηθη, και παρηγορειν τα παθη των χρωμενων μελεσι και ἁρμονιαις. Con. sep. Sap. 156.

How sour sweet Music is,
When Time is broke, and no Proportion kept?
So is it in the Music of Men's Lives.
And here have I the Daintiness of Ear

To

a *judicious Eye* in the Works of *Painting* and *Statuary*, ſhall we be *blind* to all the *Charms* of *moral Limning*, the *Proportions* of *real* Life and *Manners?* Whilſt we are *ſcrupulouſly exact* in the *Models* of our Houſes, the *Diſpoſition* of Ornaments, the *Ordering* of Gardens, Avenues, Plantations, ſhall we have no regard to the *living Architecture* of our *own Minds?* no thought of *inward Imbelliſhment?* no Taſte of the more *beautiful Oeconomy* of a human *Heart*, the *Order* and *Diſpoſition* of its Affections? Never ſurely can our Imagination reſt wholly in the mere *mechanic* and *ſenſible* Forms of Beauty; ſeeing there is provided for it a far more *refined* Entertainment in the Theory of *moral* Excellence. For no where, *Philemon*, does the *Charm* of Beauty ſo forcibly prevail as in the *moral* Species. 'Tis to this the *Virtuoſo* muſt have recourſe for the *higheſt* Gratifications of his own *favorite Paſſion*. *Virtue* alone is the Truth and Perfection of *Virtuoſoſhip*. And as abſtracted a way of reaſoning as it may be thought, 'tis however a very juſt one; that a *correct Imagination* and a *diſſolute Character* are the greateſt *Contradictions* in

To hear Time broke in a diſorder'd String:
But for the Concord of my State and Time
Had not an Ear to hear my true Time broke!

Shakeſpear's Life and Death of *Richard* the ſecond. A very juſt and pathetic Reproach this to himſelf!

the

the World *. 'Tis thus, *Philemon*, that I have ſometimes been led to conſider the *Virtuoſo-Arts* as a more *refined* and *diſguiſed* ſort of *moral Diſcipline*; by which Men of *freer Spirits* are ſometimes *unawares* trained up to a ſenſe of *Duty* and *inward Worth*, who would never be prevailed upon to liſten to a more *direct* and *formal* method of Inſtruction.

A *happy* way of *moralizing* this indeed, (ſaid I) *Hortenſius!* to learn our *Duty* in our very *Pleaſures*; and extract *Wiſdom* and *Virtue* even from the *Luxuries* and *Elegancies* of Life! But how then is it that we often find the Maſters of Morality repreſenting *theſe* things in ſo very different a Light? They are ſo far from conſidering them as *Means* or *Helps* to *Virtue*, that they will not even allow them to be ſo much as *compatible* with it; a great part of our Duty conſiſting, as they tell us, in

* Let ſuch Gentlemen as theſe (of Taſte) be as extravagant as they pleaſe, or as irregular in their Morals, they muſt at the ſame time diſcover their Inconſiſtency, live at variance with themſelves, and in contradiction to that Principle, on which they ground their higheſt Pleaſure or Entertainment. *Charact.* Vol. I. 136.——For all Vice is Diſorder, Confuſion, and a perpetual Diſcord of Life——*Æſtuat, & vitæ diſconvenit ordine toto*——is its true Character. In vain is the Love of Order, Proportion, Symmetry, pretended in the midſt of ſuch flagrant Incongruities.

the

the *abſolute Contempt* and *Renunciation* of them.

I know no Authority they have to ſay ſo, (replied *Hortenſius*:) there is certainly nothing in the nature of the things *themſelves*, that determines the *Uſe* of them to be *unlawful*. That it may be ſo in *particular* Caſes is owing to *accidental* Circumſtances; and is no more than may be ſaid of the *beſt* and moſt *innocent* things in the World. The moſt improved *Elegancies* of Life are no more *immoral* in *themſelves* than its *cheapeſt* and *coarſeſt Accommodations*. There is as little Crime in building a *Palace* to ſome People, as there is to others in raiſing a *Cottage*. *Painting* and *Gilding* and other *ornamental Arts* are as allowable in their own nature, as the uſe of *Dirt* or *Stones*. For " what greater Immorality is " there, as an ingenious Author expreſſes it, " in the Work of the fineſt Chizel, or the " niceſt Plane, than in that of an Ax or a " Saw * ?" Moreover, to what purpoſe can we imagine the Skill and Capacity of Mankind to *improve* and *better* their Condition of Being to have been given them, if they are not at *liberty* to make *uſe* of it? In ſhort, *Philemon*, there can be no Argu-

* Inquiry whether a general Practice of Virtue tends to the Wealth or Poverty of a People. Sect. 3. p. 36.

men

ment of the *abſolute Unlawfulneſs* even of what you call the *Luxuries of* Life, but may be urged with *equal* Force againſt the moſt *ordinary Comforts*, I had almoſt ſaid the very *Neceſſaries* of it. For theſe can only differ in *Degree*, not in *Kind*; and if it be allowed us to provide for the Happineſs of our *preſent* Being in a *leſs* degree, it will be difficult to give a Reaſon why we ſhould not do ſo in a *greater*, even in the *greateſt* we are capable of. I ſpeak in general, and not of *particular* Caſes and Circumſtances.

I am glad, (ſaid I) *Hortenſius*, to find you of opinion that *Pleaſure* and *Virtue* are ſuch good *Friends*. I thought they had been always repreſented as in the *Grecian* Fable, drawing quite *different* ways *. I am ſure I could mention ſome Writers in Morality, who lay as great a ſtreſs upon *Self-denial*, as if it was indeed the very *Eſſence* of all *Virtue*. And yet when one conſiders the Matter *cloſely*, one cannot but ſuſpect there muſt be ſome Error in the Account; for if Self-denial, as *ſuch*, have any *Merit* in it, the Conſe-

* Εννοεις ω Ἡρακλεις, (ἡ κακια υπολαβυσα ειπεν) ως χαλεπην και μακραν οδον επι τας ευφροσυνας ἡ γυνη σοι αυτη διηγειται. Εγω δε ραδιαν και βραχειαν οδον επι την ευδαιμονιαν αξω σε. *Xen.* Mem. Soc. lib. 2.

quence

quence is unavoidable, that the *greater* Self-denial, the *greater* Degree of Virtue. But this is more than they *themſelves* will admit of; and indeed it is a Notion that leads to infinite *Abſurdities*.

NOT *greater* (ſaid *Hortenſius*) than have been *actually* practiced in many parts of the World upon this very Principle. The *Auſterities* to which People have ſubmitted upon a falſe Perſuaſion of *Religion* are almoſt as incredible, as they are ſhocking.

I could wiſh (ſaid I) we might examine a little more particularly into the Merits of this Queſtion; and inquire upon what foundation a Perſuaſion ſo extravagant in itſelf, and ſo miſchievous in its Conſequences to the Peace and Happineſs of Mankind, ſhould yet have ſo commonly prevailed in the World.

AT preſent (replied *Hortenſius*) we are too near home to enter upon ſo large a Topic. We will adjourn it, if you pleaſe, till to-morrow Evening; when, if the Weather prove favorable for our *walking* as uſual, it may afford us no unuſeful matter of Entertainment.

PART II.

AS great a Friend as you know me to be, *Hydaſpes*, to *fair Weather* and *Sunſhine*, believe me I never gave it a more *ſincere* welcome than upon looking out the next Morning. The greateſt part of the Day we were obliged to attend ſome Company that came in upon us. But the Interruptions of *other* Subjects could not keep my Thoughts from glancing often upon *that* which we had ſo lately entered upon, and which was by agreement to imploy our Evening's Speculation. Inſomuch that I was ſometimes, I am afraid, leſs attentive to the general Converſation that was carrying on, than I could well juſtify to myſelf in point of Good-Breeding and Civility. When the Afternoon was pretty far advanc'd, our Viſitants who came from ſome diſtance, were obliged to leave us. *Hortenſius* had little more than time to give ſome neceſſary Orders in his Family, before the Heat of the Day was enough worn off to invite us abroad, in one of the moſt delightful Evenings I have ever known.

I was going to remind him of the Point he had ingaged to ſpeak to, when I found myſelf very agreably prevented by his breaking into it of his own accord in the following manner.—— The *Stillneſs* of the *Evening*, (ſaid he) *Philemon*, is at all times a very conſiderable Help to ſerious Reflection. It *ſooths* and *compoſes* our Thoughts, and throws the Mind into a State of *Peace* and *Tranquillity* analogous to *that* of itſelf. But never ſurely can the *Advantages* of it be more *conſpicuous* than in the Diſquiſition we are now to enter upon concerning the general *Lawfulneſs* of *Pleaſure*; ſeeing it does *itſelf* abound with ſo many *refined* and *exquiſite Entertainments* neceſſarily *offering* themſelves to our *Senſe*, as may in great meaſure decide the Point to our hands, and render all other Proofs ſuperfluous. How *charming*, *Philemon*, appears the *whole Face* of *Nature* about us! What an *uniform Variety* in thoſe natural Landſcapes! what a *delightful Melody* in the Woods! what an *agreable Verdure* in the Meadows! what a *cooling Freſhneſs* in the Air! what an *exquiſite Fragrancy* in the mingled Scents of Shrubs and Flowers! whilſt, as *Milton* elegantly ſpeaks,

gentle Gales
Fanning their odoriferous Wings diſpenſe

Native Perfumes, and whiſper whence they ſtole
Their balmy Spoils *.

Above all, *Philemon*, what an inimitable *Scene* of *Beauty* is now offering itſelf to our Obſervation in the View of yonder *ſetting Sun* innobled with all that diverſity of finely painted Clouds, which, as if deſirous to continue his Preſence amongſt us, ſeem, as it were, to *retard* the *parting Ray*, and give it back again to our Sight in thoſe multiplied Reflexions, which *adorn* the Weſtern Horizon! At the ſame time, behold there in the Eaſt the *Moon's more ſober Light* † beginning to diſcloſe itſelf! See her *riſing*, as the ſame divine *Milton* has it, in *clouded Majeſty* ‖ *!* And as the *Strength* of Day-light gradually wears away, preparing to introduce the *milder Graces* of the Evening! Who can reflect on the *delightful Viciſſitude*, and not feel a ſecret Tranſport ſpringing up in his Breaſt, the Expreſſion of a devout Gratitude towards the beneficent *Author* of his Happineſs? But how, *Philemon*, does the Rapture yet grow upon us, when, borrowing Helps from a more *improved Philoſophy*, we conſider the Glories we are now ſur-

* *Par. Loſt*, Book IV. 155.
† Mr. *Pope*'s Epiſt. of the Char. of Women, 158.
‖ *Par. Loſt*, B. IV. 606, 7.

veying,

veying, not as confined to the little Globe of our *Earth*, to the Obſervation of a few retired *Speculatiſts here* like *ourſelves*; but that a *Scene* of the *ſame* kind may probably in every conceivable Moment of Duration be preſenting itſelf to ſome or other of the rational Inhabitants of thoſe *numberleſs Worlds* which lie diffuſed in the wide Expanſes of *Æther*; and be entertaining the curious *Spectator* of Nature in Regions of ſo immenſe a Diſtance from our own, that the Imagination turns giddy at the very thought of it! For who ſhall preſume to ſet bounds to the Productions of *infinite Power* actuated by *infinite Benevolence*? Who ſhall circumſcribe the *Theatre* upon which an *Omnipotent Goodneſs* may think proper to diſplay itſelf? Queſtionleſs thoſe *ſparkling Fires* which are preparing to roll over our Heads have a *nobler* Uſe than barely to ſpangle our particular *Hemiſphere*; a Benefit which every *paſſing Cloud* can deprive us of!——How much more rational is it to conſider them as the ſeveral *Suns* of different *Syſtems* of *Planets*, diſpenſing to them the *invaluable* Comforts of Light, and Heat, and refreſhing Influences; and in particular affording them the *grateful Returns* of Day and Night, whoſe *mutual Interchanges* may contribute, as they do with us, to *relieve* and *recommend* each the other?

I am intirely of your Opinion, (ſaid I) *Hortenſius*; the Contemplation of Nature in *rural Scenes* is one of the moſt *delightful Entertainments* that the Mind of Man is capable of. Pleaſures of this kind, if they have not ſo much of Tumult in them as the ſprightlier Joys of the *miſ-named* Voluptuous, have much more of real Satisfaction. Moreover, they leave a good Reliſh behind them when they are paſt; and, which is of much higher Conſideration, are calculated to *improve*, as well as *entertain* our Thoughts. They *refine* our Spirits, and *humanize* our Tempers; ſoften the Mind into a Forgetfulneſs of *Wrath*, *Malice*, and every *turbulent* and *diſquieting* Paſſion *; give *amiable* Impreſſions of *Na-*

* What Anger, Envy, Hatred, or Revenge, can long torment his Breaſt, whom not only the greateſt and nobleſt Objects, but every Sand, every Pebble, every Graſs, every Earth, every Fly can divert? to whom the return of every Seaſon, every Month, every Day, do ſuggeſt a Circle of moſt pleaſant Reflections? If the Ancients preſcribed it as a ſufficient Remedy againſt ſuch violent Paſſions only to repeat the *Alphabet* over, whereby Leiſure was given to the Mind to recover itſelf from any ſudden Fury, then how much more effectual Medicines againſt the ſame Diſtempers may be fetched from the whole *Alphabet* of *Nature*, which repreſents itſelf to our Conſideration in ſo many infinite Volumes! *Sprat's* Hiſt. of the Royal Soc. p. 345.

ture,

ture, *Mankind*, and a *Deity* *; inſpire an *inlarg'd* Senſe of *public Good*, an *exquiſite* Taſte of *Liberty*, *Humanity*, and *private Friendſhip*. They put us in *good Humor* with *ourſelves*, and with the *general* Scheme and Conſtitution of Things †.

OF all natural Speculations (reſum'd *Hortenſius*) there is none more calculated to refine and humanize the Mind, to give

* Thoſe who have a Reliſh of the Beauties of Nature ſeem to converſe, as it were, with Deity in its *kindeſt* and moſt *ingaging* Appearances; not ſo much in the *Majeſty* of Omnipotence, as in the *Mildneſs* of Love and Benignity.

† 'Tis obſervable, we are never ſo well inclined towards other People, as when we are moſt in humor with ourſelves. In reſpect of this happy Frame of Mind, the Man of polite Imagination has great Advantages. He injoys a much larger Range of innocent Pleaſures than lies within the ordinary Compaſs. He has Satisfactions of the moſt exquiſite kind, with which the Vulgar, great and ſmall, are wholly unacquainted. ——He looks upon the World, as it were, in another Light, and diſcovers it in a multitude of Charms, that conceal themſelves from the Generality of Mankind. *Spect.* Vol. VI. N°. 411. —— If we caſt an eye on all the Tempeſts which ariſe within our Breaſts, we ſhall find that they are chiefly produc'd by Idleneſs. Whatever ſhall be able to buſy the Minds of Men with a conſtant Courſe of innocent Amuſements, or to fill them with as vigorous and pleaſant Images, as thoſe ill Impreſſions by which they are deluded, it will certainly have a ſurer effect in the compoſing and purifying of their Thoughts, than all the rigid Precepts of the Stoical, or the empty Diſtinctions of the Peripatetic Moraliſts. *Sprat's* Hiſt. R. S. 343.

it

it an inlarged and liberal Senſe of Things, than the Theory of the heavenly Bodies, as it is opened to us by the modern Philoſophy *. How does it beat down the little Pride of *Conqueſt*, the Triumphs of *Ambition*, the Glories of *Empire*, tho' we were Maſters of them to a far *greater* degree than ever fell within the compaſs of any human Proweſs, to conſider, that not this or that *particular* Spot or *Country* only, but the *whole Earth* itſelf, the moſt extended Scene of ſublunary Greatneſs that even the Wantonneſs of Imagination can figure to us, is no more than a *ſingle Point* in the *Immenſity* of the Univerſe †! And that an *Alexander*, or a *Cæſar*, after all the

* What room can there be for low and little things in a Mind ſo nobly imployed? What ambitious Diſquiets can torment that Man, who has ſo much Glory before him? *Sprat*'s Hiſt. 345.

† We are told by *Plutarch* that it had this Effect upon *Alexander*, when he heard the Philoſopher reaſoning concerning a Plurality of Worlds. Αλεξανδρ@ Αναξαρχε περι κοσμων απειριας ακουων εδακρυε, και των φιλων ερωτωντων ὁ, τι πεπονθεν, ουκ αξιον (εφη) δακρυειν, ει κοσμων ουτων απειρων, ἑν@ ουδεπω κυριοι γεγοναμεν; *De An. tranq.* p. 466.

His Conduct upon this Occaſion is well expoſed by the Satiriſt——

Unus Pellæo juveni non ſufficit orbis:
Æſtuat infelix anguſti limite mundi,
Ut Gyaræ clauſus ſcopulis, parvâque Seripho.——

And the Reflection he makes upon it is very moral and judicious. *Juv.* Sat. X. lib. 4. 168.

fine

fine things that are ſaid of them by *Poets* and *Hiſtorians*, the one with all *Greece* at his Devotion, and the other, as Mr. *Pope* ſomewhere excellently paints him, with a *Roman Senate at his heels*, in all the *Pageantry* of Victory, the *Exultation* of flattered Succeſs, might yet appear to the Eye of *ſuperior* Intelligences as really *low* and *little*, with regard to the ſcope of their Ambition, as if, like Children, they had been all the while laying out themſelves in purſuit of a rich *Plume* of *Feathers*, or inamoured of the Muſic of a *Rattle* *! Alas that being full as *idly* imployed, they ſhould not have been likewiſe as *innocently ſo* †!

BUT

* The Poet thought he had ſufficiently reproached this Hero-Madneſs, when he upbraidingly addreſſed himſelf to one of great Character that way in this very ſevere Sarcaſm——

——*I demens, & ſævas curre per Alpeis*
Ut pueris placeas, & declamatio fias. Ibid. 166.

† This Thought is finely touched by *Seneca* in his firſt Book *de Clementia*.——Quod iſtud, Dii boni, malum eſt, occidere, ſævire, delectari ſono catenarum, & civium capita decidere, quocumque ventum eſt multum ſanguinis fundere, aſpectu ſuo terrere, ac fugare? quæ alia vita eſſet, ſi leones urſique regnarent? ſi ſerpentibus in nos, & noxioſiſſimo cuique animali daretur poteſtas? illa rationis expertia, & a nobis immanitatis crimine damnata, abſtinent ſuis; & tuta eſt etiam inter feras ſimilitudo: horum ne a neceſſariis quidem rabies temperat ſibi, ſed externa, ſuaque, in æquo habet, quo poſſit, exercitatior a ſingulorum cædibus, deinde in exitia gentium ſerpere. nullum orna-

But not to inſiſt, *Philemon*, upon the many *excellent Moralities* to which Thoughts of this nature evidently lead us, (tho' this, it muſt be owned, is no inconſiderable ſupport of our main Principle, by repreſenting to us ſome of the nobleſt *Satisfactions* of Life, as connected with the higheſt *moral Improvements* of it *) let us conſider

mentum Principis faſtigio dignius pulchriuſque eſt, quam illa corona ob cives ſervatos. Non hoſtilia arma detracta victis; non currus barbarorum ſanguine cruenti; non parta bello ſpolia. Hæc divina potentia eſt, gregatim ac publice ſervare: multos autem occidere, & indiſcretos, incendii, ac ruinæ potentia eſt. *Sen.* de Clementia Lib 1. ap. finem. ——A very good modern Author has adopted this humane Sentiment, and given it a very beautiful Turn thus——

The Grecian *Chief, Enthuſiaſt of his Pride,*
With Rage and Terror ſtalking by his ſide,
Raves round the Globe; he ſoars into a God!
Stand faſt Olympus, *and ſuſtain his Nod.*
The Peſt divine in horrid Grandeur reigns,
And thrives on Mankind's Miſeries and Pains.
And cannot thrice ten hundred Years unpraiſe
The boiſt'rous Boy, and blaſt his guilty Bays?
Why want we then Encomiums on the Storm,
Or Famine, or Volcano? they perform
Their mighty Deeds; they Hero like can ſlay,
And ſpread their ample Deſarts in a Day.

Univ. Paſſion, Sat. VII. p. 163, 4.

* The Antients plainly had this Notion of natural Contemplations, and conſider them as having a moral Uſe and Tendency. So *Tully* tells us, that the Order and Regularity of external Nature is intended as a Model for the Imitation of Mankind in their private and particular Syſtem. Ipſe autem Homo ortus eſt ad

ſider the Conſtitution of Things in its more obvious Appearance, merely as a *natural Foundation* of *Pleaſure* to us. A Man muſt have loſt his very *Senſes*, and become a piece of *uninform'd* Mechaniſm, before he can behold the *chearful Face* of *Nature* with Coldneſs and Indifferency. No ſooner does he open his Eyes, but numberleſs *gay Scenes* immediately diſplay themſelves to his view; the various Forms, the Arrangements, the Colorings of ſurrounding Objects inſtantly ſtrike his Attention; and all Nature appears to him, as was ſaid of the *Author* of it, *in perfect Beauty* *. Whilſt his Hearing continues unimpaired, he will be often very *agreably* entertained with grateful Sounds in the *natural* Muſic of Birds, the Fannings of Woods, the Purling of Streams, or the Falls of Water. In ſpight of the moſt *ſullen Sanctity*, which would deprive him

ad mundum *contemplandum* & *imitandum*. De Nat. Deorum, Lib. II. p. 142,3. *ed. Dav.*——Parallel to that Paſſage in his Treatiſe *de Senectute*—Credo Deos immortales ſparſiſſe animos in corpora humana, ut eſſent, qui cæleſtium *ordinum* contemplantes, *imitarentur* eum vitæ *modo* atque *conſtantia*—*ed. Græv.* p. 448. 21. To the ſame purpoſe *M. Antoninus* adviſes, Περισκοπειν ας̃ρων ὁρμας, ὡσπερ συμπεριθεοντα, και πας των σ̃οιχειων εις αλληλα μεταβολας συνεχως ενvοειν, αποκαθαιρυσι γαρ αἱ τυτων Φαντασιαι τον ρυπον τυ χαμαι βιυ. Lib. 7. 47. Ibid. Lib. 11. 27.

* Pſalm. 50. 1.

of the innocent Comforts of his Being, he will be ſometimes *unavoidably* refreſhed with cooling Breezes, or cheared with delicious Odors. The Benefits of Light, and Sunſhine, healthful Air, and kindly Seaſons, muſt *force* many very *ſenſible Satisfactions* upon him, whether he will or not; and by a *merciful Violence* often conſtrain him to be *happy* *. Even the appointed means of preſerving *Life* itſelf muſt let in upon him many *comfortable* Senſations; nor can he ſatisfy the neceſſary *Demands* of his animal Nature, without a conſiderable *Indulgence* and *Gratification* of it †. So largely has an all-bountiful Creator

* Non dat Deus beneficia. Unde ergo iſta quæ poſſides? quæ das? quæ negas? quæ ſervas? quæ rapis? unde hæc innumerabilia, oculos, aureis, animum mulcentia?——Si domus tibi donetur, in quâ marmoris aliquid reſplendeat, & tectum nitidius auro aut coloribus ſparſum, non mediocre munus vocabis: ingens tibi domicilium, ſine ullo incendii aut ruinæ metu, ſtruxit, in quo vides non tenues cruſtas, ſed integras lapidis pretioſiſſimi moles, ſed totas variæ diſtinctæque materiæ, cujus tu parvula fruſta miraris; tectum vero aliter nocte, aliter interdiu fulgens. *Sen.* de Ben. Lib. 4. cap. 5. 6. —— It is very manifeſt, that the Author of Nature is ſo far from forbidding us Entertainments, that he has put it out of our power not to injoy them in great plenty and variety, by making almoſt every thing about us ſo gay and delightful. *Campbell's* ΑΡΕΤΗ-ΛΟΓΙΑ, p. 110. and elſewhere.—Spect. Vol. 5. N°. 387. 393.

† Unde illa luxuriam quoque inſtruens copia? neque enim neceſſitatibus tantummodo noſtris proviſum eſt;

ator provided for the Happineſs and Good of every *ſenſitive* Being, that no Efforts of *moroſe* and *peeviſh* Virtue can entirely overrule the *benevolent* Conſtitution of Nature, but even the moſt *ingenious* Artificers of their *own Miſery* ſhall be often *unavoidably* diſappointed *.

eſt: uſque in delicias amamur. tot arbuſta, non uno modo frugifera, tot herbæ ſalutares, tot varietates ciborum per totum annum digeſtæ, ut inerti quoque fortuita terræ alimenta præberent. jam animalia omnis generis——ut omnis rerum naturæ pars tributum aliquod nobis conferret—unde iſta palatum tuum ſaporibus exquiſitis ultra ſatietatem laceſſentia? unde hæc irritamenta jam laſſæ voluptatis? *Sen.* ubi ſupra.—— Nevertheleſs the ſenſual Pleaſures of Taſte are the leaſt part of that Happineſs to which our Appetites of Hunger and Thirſt are intended to lead us. They are the Foundation of many ſocial Exerciſes, and moral Entertainments. Ου γαρ ὡς αʃγειου ἡκει κομιζων ἑαυτον εμπλησαι προς το δειπνου ὁ νὺ εχων, αλλα και σπυδασαι τι και παιξαι, και ακυσαι, και ειπειν, ὃ ὁ καιρος παρακαλει τυς συνοντας, ει μελλυσι μετ' αλληλων ἡδεως εσεσθαι. Plut. con. ſept. Sap. 147.—— Ουκυν εργου εʃι τυ Διονυσυ μεθη και οινῳ, αλλ' ἡν εμποιυσι δια τυτων φιλοφροσυνην, και παθον, και ὁμιλιαν ἡμιν, και συνηθειαν προς αλληλυς. ibid. 156. As a Proof of this, could any Man be pleaſed with a Company of *Statues* ſurrounding his Table ſo artfully contrived as to conſume his various Courſes, and inſpired by ſome Servant, like ſo many Puppets, to give the uſual trifling Returns in praiſe of their Fare? *Inquiry into Orig.* &c. p. 236.

* This Profuſion of the fineſt Delights ſpread all over the Heavens and the Earth can never be counted vicious or criminal, ſince the Author of Nature has made it plainly inevitable. ΑΡΕΤΗ-ΛΟΓΙΑ, p. 110.

ONE

ONE would think, (interpoſed I) *Hortenſius*, that *Happineſs* was not ſo very *uninviting* a *Form*, that Men ſhould need to be thus over-ruled, as it were, to imbrace it. Yet ſuch is the perverſe Blindneſs of *Superſtition*, that it even takes a Merit to itſelf in rejecting as far as may be the *offered Good*, and throwing *back* the Favours of indulgent Heaven upon its hands as not *worth* acceptance. A ſtrange way of recommending itſelf to the *Deity*, by fighting, as it were, continually againſt him *! Whilſt, as you rightly have obſerved, if there be any Meaning in natural Language, the whole *Voice* of Things univerſally reclaims to the *prepoſterous* Devotion.

WE may imagine (replied he) that the kind Author of the Univerſe, foreſeeing what *uncouth* Pains ſome gloomy Spirits would take to bring Miſery upon themſelves under a fond Perſuaſion of doing him ſervice by it, has, in pity to their deluded Apprehenſions, conſtituted almoſt

* Superſtitio error inſanus eſt: amandos timet, quos colit, violat. *Sen.* Epiſt. 123. ap. finem. For what elſe is it but to affront and injure the Deity, for the Superſtitious to imagine, as *Plutarch* ſpeaks, Φοβερον το ευμενες, και τυραννικον το πατρικον; και δλαβεραν, το κηδεμονικον, και το αμικτον αγριον και θηριωδες; De Super. 167.

every

every thing about us a neceſſary Source of *Pleaſure* to the human Breaſt, on purpoſe in ſome degree to *counterbalance* the Effects of ſuch unnatural Perverſeneſs: inſomuch that a Man muſt throw up his very *Being* itſelf, who would entirely exclude *every* joyous Senſation. And thus does the *Aſcetic-Principle* at laſt defeat its own ends; ſince it can no otherwiſe fill up the *Meaſure* of our Mortification, than by depriving us of the very *Capacity* of it. The ſame extravagant Self-denial that gives the *final Stroke* to our Happineſs, by a fortunate Inconſiſtence with itſelf, *determining* our Virtue likewiſe.

But we are by no means got to the bottom of this Argument. Hitherto we have dwelt only on the Surface or Outſide of things. If we deſcend a little into the *Philoſophy* of thoſe ſeveral delightful Perceptions which Nature ſo liberally adminiſters to us, we ſhall diſcover a more *exquiſite* Apparatus in the *Oeconomy* of our ſenſible Pleaſures than is generally, I believe, apprehended. There is no one of our Senſes that affords us ſo large a Variety of pleaſing Ideas as our *Sight*. 'Tis to this we are indebted for all that abundant Profuſion of *natural Beauty* that adorns the whole viſible Creation. Now what are the ſeveral *Colorings* of outward Objects, thoſe

thoſe magnificent *Shews* and *Apparitions* that on all hands preſent themſelves to our View; thoſe *Lights* and *Shades* of Nature's Pencil, that ſo agreably *diverſify* the general Face of the Univerſe? what, I ſay, are they, *Philemon*, but a ſet of *arbitrary Modifications* of the *perceiving* Mind, to which the ſeveral Objects *themſelves* have not the leaſt *Reſemblance* *? For what Agreement is there in the nature of the thing between a certain particular Bulk, Figure, or Motion of the inſenſible parts of external Matter, the only *real* Qualities of the ſeveral viſible Bodies that ſo variouſly entertain our Sight, and our Ideas of *Light* and *Colors?* and yet what a joyleſs and uncomfortable Figure would theſe things make to us, if we ſaw them in their *naked* and *philoſophic* Realities! What a large field of Pleaſure and Admiration would be loſt to us, were all the *maſterly Touches* of natural Painting, the *variegated Scenery* of Heaven and Earth, at once to diſappear, and an *undiſtinguiſhed Blot* to overſpread the *univerſal* Syſtem! To what purpoſe then ſuch a *prodigal* Expence of Art and Ornament in the Furniture of this *ſtupendous Theatre* of Nature, but to *charm* the *raviſhed* Senſe of the intended *Spectator* by

* See *Locke*'s Eſſay con. Hum. Und. chap. 8.

the

the proſpect of theſe *imaginary* Glories *? We may purſue this Speculation yet farther——The Perceptions of our Taſte and Smell, the Ideas of Sounds, from which are derived all the *inchanting* Powers of Harmony, an *Entertainment* which ſome have thought worthy of *Heaven* itſelf, the Senſations of Heat and Cold, and divers other Affections of our Touch, are quite *other* things in our Minds from what they are in the ſeveral *exciting* Objects. Providence, as if the *real* Qualities of Bodies were too *ſcanty* a Foundation of Pleaſure to the human Senſe, has ſuperadded to them many *imaginary* Properties and Powers of affecting us, in order to *inlarge* the Sphere of our Bleſſings, and in a more eminent Degree to *indear* to us the Reliſh of our preſent Being †.

To take the matter, *Philemon*, in a different light,——it is obſervable that ſome of the greateſt *Beauties* of Nature are at the ſame time the greateſt *Beneſits* of it. Fruits which are moſt *agreable* to the Eye, are often the *pleaſanteſt* to the Taſte likewiſe. There is nothing that affords a greater

* *Spect.* Vol. 6. N°. 413. Our Souls are at preſent delightfully loſt and bewilder'd in a pleaſing Deluſion, and we walk about like the Hero of a Romance.—— Alſo N°. 387. Vol. 5.

† *Lock. Spect.* as before.

ſupply of Comforts to human Life than the Improvements of Agriculture; and at the ſame time there is not a *finer* piece of Landſcape than the View of a *fertile Country* richly *diverſify'd* with the ſeveral Products of *natural Grain*; whoſe agreable *Wavings* add Novelty to their other Charms, and entertain us no leſs with the Variety of the Scene, than with the inimitable Beauty of it. The ſeveral kinds of Plantation are at once *uſeful* and *entertaining* to the Owners of them. They not only throw *a Man's whole Eſtate into a Garden*, as the Spectator ſpeaks, but by a happy Union of the *agreable* and *beneficial* improve his *Poſſeſſions*, as well as his *Proſpect*. Who ſees not, as the ſame Author, I remember, goes on, that *a Mountain ſhaded with Oaks*, or *a Marſh overgrown with Willows*, are both more *advantageous* and more *beautiful*, than either of them in their uncultivated State *?

And yet, (I could not avoid interrupting) *Hortenſius*, ſo careful has the great Diſpoſer of things been that *no part* of his Works ſhould paſs *unrecommended* to us, that even the ſeeming *Wildneſſes* and *Imperfections* of Nature, as Marſhes, Deſerts, Rocks, Precipices, are not without their

* *Spect.* Vol. 6. N°. 414.

Charms;

Charms; they entertain us with their *Novelty*, and *Magnificence* at leaſt, if not with their *Beauty* *. And moreover they may be conſidered as *Foils* to the more *graceful* parts; or as *Diſcords* happily interſperſed in the *Compoſition* of things, to render the *general Harmony* of Nature more exquiſite and inchanting.

It may be added, (returned he) that not only *Irregularities* and *ſeeming Imperfections*, but even *Horrors* themſelves, when Reaſon or Experience has removed the firſt Impreſſions of our *Fear*, are no ſmall Foundation of *Pleaſure* to us: as *Fire*, *Ruins*, *Hurricanes*, a *ſtormy Sky*, a *troubled Ocean*, a *wild Beaſt in chains*, or a *dead Monſter* †: either from the natural Magnificence, or Novelty of the Objects that excite them, as in the laſt Article; or from the *agreable* Contemplation of our own *perſonal Safety*; whilſt they are conſidered by us as at once *dreadful* and *harmleſs* ||.

* *Spect.* Vol. 6. 412. 5. 387.

† *Hutch.* Inquiry, p. 72.

|| *Spect.* Vol. 6. N°. 418. *Lucretius* was well acquainted with this Source of Pleaſure, as may be ſeen in his ſecond Book:

Suave mari magno, turbantibus æquora ventis,
E terrâ alterius magnum ſpectare laborem:
Non quia vexari quemquam eſt jucunda voluptas,
Sed, quibus ipſe malis careas, quia cernere ſuave eſt.
Lib. II. 1.

WHAT an amiable Scene of things, (ſaid I) do theſe Reflections open to our View! thoſe parts of Nature which are more immediately adapted to our *Entertainment* or our *Uſe*, are as *common*, as they are *beneficial*. The ſeeming *Deviations* from either, (beſides that it is probable they have a *real*, tho' more *remote* Connection with both) are not only *few*, and *extraordinary*, but moreover this very Circumſtance of their being *ſo*, by gratifying our Taſte of Novelty, gives them a ſort of relative *Agreableneſs*.

IF the ſeeming Imperfections of *external* Nature (reſumed *Hortenſius*) are thus beautifully inſtrumental to our greater Pleaſure, much more may this be ſaid of thoſe of our own *private* and *perſonal* Syſtem, the Imperfections of our *Senſes* and Powers of Perception. It has been often, and very juſtly, obſerved by Writers in behalf of a Providence, that a more *improved* State of our bodily Organs would in the preſent Situation of things not only deprive us of ſeveral Advantages we are now poſſeſſed of, but convert ſome of our greateſt *Pleaſures* into the moſt exquiſite *Torments*. Whilſt, as it is admirably repreſented by the incomparable Author of the Eſſay on Man, were our feeling increaſed to a more *delicate* Senſe, we ſhould only become

tremblingly

tremblingly alive all o'er,
To ſmart and agonize at ev'ry Pore.
Or quick Effluvia darting thro' the Brain,
Die of a Roſe in aromatic Pain *.

What a delightful and entertaining Scene, *Philemon*, is even now diſplaying itſelf to our Obſervation, in this ſpacious Canopy of Heaven inriched with an Infinity of *ſhining Orbs* that ſhed their benign Influences upon our Heads, and make Night auſpicious! and yet we are indebted for all this beautiful Repreſentation of things to the *Imperfection* of our Sight in diſcerning Diſtances. How elſe could we delude ourſelves with imagining the ſeveral Bodies that compoſe it, Bodies of ſuch infinitely varied Magnitudes, and Diſtances from each other, to be as ſo many *lucid Points* in the *Circumference* of a great concave Sphere †? But however we are deceived

* *Pope*'s Eſſay on Man, I. 189. How, ſays an eminent Writer, could we ſuſtain the Preſſure of our very Clothes in ſuch a Condition; much leſs carry Burthens and provide for Conveniences of Life? we could not bear the Aſſault of an Inſect, or a Feather, or a Puff of Air without Pain. There are Examples now of wounded Perſons, that have roared for Anguiſh and Torment at the Diſcharge of Ordnance, tho' at a very great diſtance: what inſupportable Torture then ſhould we be under upon a like Concuſſion in the Air, when all the whole Body would have the Tenderneſs of a Wound? *Bentley*'s *Boyle*'s Lect. Serm. 3. p. 99.

† *Hutch.* Inquir. p. 20.

by

by this Appearance, 'tis a Deception greatly in our favour; and whoever ſhould inlarge the Sphere of our *Viſion*, would leſſen that of our *Entertainment* *.

To

* This Obſervation may be carried much farther; 'tis to the Imperfection of our Sight that a great deal of that Beauty we diſcern in outward Objects is owing. If our Eye was ſo acute as to rival the fineſt Microſcopes, it would make every thing appear rugged and deformed: the moſt finely poliſhed Cryſtal would be uneven and rough; the Sight of our own ſelves would affright us. *Bent.* p. 97.—So likewiſe was our Hearing increaſed proportionably, every Breath of Wind would incommode us: we ſhould have no Sleep in the ſilenteſt Nights and moſt ſolitary Places: we muſt inevitably be ſtruck deaf or dead with the Noiſe of a Clap of Thunder, *Bent.* p. 98.—Nay the Author of the excellent Eſſay goes yet farther, and ſays of Man,

If Nature thunder'd in his opening Ears,
And ſtunn'd him with the Muſic of the Spheres,
How would he wiſh that Heav'n had left him ſtill
The whiſp'ring Zephyr, and the purling Rill?

I. 194.

There is a very material Uſe of the preſent Conſtitution of our Senſes yet behind. Had we a microſcopic Eye, we could not ſee at one view above the Space of an Inch, and it would take a conſiderable time to ſurvey the mountainous Bulk of our own Bodies. *Bent.* p. 97. We ſhould be literally, what a ludicrous Author makes his fabulous Voyager to have appeared to the Inhabitants of a certain Iſland, to ourſelves and one another, ſo many *Men-Mountains*. We might *inſpect a Mite* with great Curioſity, but could neither *comprehend the Heavens*, nor any other Objects of our preſent Sight. Or if our Hearing were more exquiſite, what Confuſion and Inconvenience would it introduce into civil Life? Whiſpers might then be as juſtly criminal, as they have been made ſo by

To paſs on to another Topic.——We have already, *Philemon*, conſidered the Love of Novelty as it is calculated to give pleaſure to certain Objects, that have otherwiſe *little* or *none* in themſelves *; let us inquire next how it ſeems to affect ſuch as confeſſedly have the *greateſt*. 'Tis a well-known Truth, that *the Eye is not ſatisfied with ſeeing, nor the Ear with hearing* †. Poſſeſſion ſoon cloys and fatigues the Senſe, and Change is a neceſſary Requiſite to laſting Satisfaction. Nay ſo intoxicated are we often with this fickle Paſſion, as to give up a *greater* good in purchaſe of a *leſs*, meerly becauſe it is an *untried* one. In the mean while, however we may pervert the Paſſion to our detriment in particular Inſtances, the general Uſe and Deſign of it is remarkably beneficial to us. Providence, having made *every thing* in ſome way or other the means of *Good* to Man, forbids him to dwell long upon the *ſame Objects*, in order that he may more *fully* experiment this *comfortable Truth*, and by *different* Applications taſte the *varied Good* that is ſo liberally provided for him.

by ſome mercileſs Tyrants.—What Affairs that moſt require it, could be tranſacted with Secrecy? *Bent. Pope*, as before.

* *Spect.* Vol. 6. N°. 412.

† *Eccleſ.* ch. 1. v. 8.

You

You was hinting, (ſaid I) *Hortenſius*, ſome time ago at the ſingular Kindneſs of our Creator in annexing a ſenſible Delight, Refreſhment, and Complacency, to the Uſe of thoſe *ordinary* Means of Subſiſtence, by which *particular* and *individual* Life is appointed to be ſuſtained. The Obſervation is yet more eminently true of thoſe more *myſterious* ones by which is provided for the Continuance and Propagation of the *Species* of Mankind. Nature has given a very high Reliſh of Pleaſure to the *Concurrence* of the Sexes, in order, no doubt, to counterbalance the unavoidable Inconveniences of Marriage; to ſweeten the Pangs of Child-birth, to recommend the Fatigues of domeſtic Concerns, of the Care of Offſpring, of the Education and Settlement of a Family; and moreover to be the Foundation and the Cement of thoſe numberleſs tender Sympathies, mutual Indearments, and Reciprocations of Love between the married Parties *themſelves*, which make up not the *Morality* only, but even the *chief Happineſs* of Conjugal Life *; and at the Envy of which, in ſo remarkable an Exemplification of it, as the Condition of the firſt Parents of Mankind is repreſented to have been by the tender and paſſionate *Milton*, 'tis no wonder their great Enemy

* *Hutch.* Inquir. 256, 257.

ſhould turn aſide from beholding their mutual Careſſes, as unable to indure the Pain of his malicious Reſentment at ſuch *ſuperior Delicacy* of Injoyment.

——*Aſide the Devil turn'd*
For Envy, yet with jealous leer malign
Ey'd them aſkance ——— *.

An Image of ſuch exquiſite *Force* and *Beauty* this, that the fondeſt Lovers of Antiquity may be challeng'd to produce its Parallel in the moſt approved Writers of any Age or Country!

And yet, *Philemon*, (replied he) as careful as our Creator has been to keep off any unjuſt *Stain* from an Inſtitution ſo wiſely adapted to all the Purpoſes of human Condition, and which draws us no leſs forcibly by the Charm of the higheſt *moral*, than *ſenſible* Pleaſures; he has not been able to ſcreen it from the Reproaches and Calumnies of ſuperſtitious and enthuſiaſtic Zealots in all Ages, who have done their utmoſt to depreciate Marriage as a *low* and *carnal* State, unworthy the pious Heroiſm of thoſe *refined* Spirits, who ſcorning to act their part well as *mere Men*, aſpire to the Life of *Angels*; and renouncing the *dull* and *ſottiſh* Pleaſures of Senſe, affect a more *acceptable* Obedience to Heaven

* *Milton's* Par. Loſt. B. IV. l. 502.

in imaginary Exercises of greater *Purity* and *Perfection* *.

OUR

* This Notion seems to have been pretty general amongst the earliest Christian Writers: at least this is the most favorable Construction one can put upon many of their very harsh Expressions upon this Subject. Thus *Justin Martyr* calls Marriage τον δι επιθυμιας ανομον γαμον. ap. Grabe Spicileg. Patrum, Tom. 2. p. 180. And again tells us, και ὁ Κυριος δε ἡμων Ιησους Χριστος ὁ δι αλλο τι εκ παρθενου ετεχθη, αλλ' ἱνα καταργηση γεννησιν επιθυμιας ανομου, και δειξη οτι και δια συνεσιας ανθρωπινης δυνατην ειναι τω Θεω την ανθρωπου στλασιν. Ibid. p. 180, 181. & alibi.——*Irenæus* speaking of the Law of Divorce amongst the Jews as a matter indulged them, *because of the Hardness of their Hearts*, not simply right in itself, considers the lawful Use of Marriage under the new Testament in the same light. ——Et quid dicimus de Veteri Testamento hæc? quandoquidem & in novo Apostoli hoc idem facientes inveniantur propter prædictam causam, statim dicente Paulo; *hæc autem ego dico, non Dominus.* Et iterum. *hoc autem dico secundum indulgentiam, non secundum præceptum?* Lib. 4. cap. 15. (vulg. 29.) to the same purpose *Athenagoras*. Το εν παρθενια και εν ευνυχια μεινας μαλλον παρισησι τω Θεω. Legat. Cap. 29. ed. Oxon. *Methodius* in his Banquet of Virgins finds this Sentiment in the very Word which in *Greek* signifies Virginity (παρθενια) by a very slight Alteration; as does *Jerom* afterwards in the *Latin* Word *cælebs*.—— Cœlibes (says he) unde & ipsum nomen inditum est, quod cœlo digni sint, qui coitu careant. *Hieron.* Op. Tom. 4. p. 228. ed. Par. both probably with equal Authority, that of their own extravagant Fancy only. ——Of the same Opinion was *Tertullian*. Nihil tale Paulus indulsit, (says he) qui totam carnis necessitatem de probis etiam titulis obliterare conatur. indulget nuptias, parcit sane matrimoniis. hoc ei supererat,

carnem

OUR Poet, (ſaid I) than whom no one ſeems to have had a tenderer ſenſe of the more improved Felicities of *wedded Love*, has painted, I remember, theſe fantaſtic Refiners in their proper Colors in the following Lines of the ſame incomparable Poem———.

———Hypocrites auſterely talk
Of Purity, and Place, and Innocence,
Defaming as impure, what God declares
Pure, and commands to ſome, leaves free to all.
Our Maker bids increaſe—who bids abſtain,
But our Deſtroyer—Foe to God and Man?
Hail wedded Love———
Founded in Raſon, loyal, juſt, and pure;
Far be it, that I ſhould write thee Sin, or blame!
Or think thee unbefitting holieſt Place,
Perpetual Fountain of domeſtic Sweets *!*

VERY different (returned he) was the Opinion of ſome grave *Fathers* of the *Church*, who were for baniſhing the *Rites*

carnem vel a ſordibus purgare, a *maculis* enim non poteſt. *De Pud.* 568, 569. ed. Lond. in 1689. The Diſtinction, it muſt be owned, is ſomewhat nice, but the comfort is, 'tis *Tertullian*'s Diſtinction, and not St. *Paul*'s. The falſe Reaſonings, as well as groſs Miſapplications of Scripture, to be met with in the generality of the Fathers upon this Article, are endleſs.

* *Milton*'s Par. Loſt, B. IV. 744.

myſterious of connubial Love *, as our Author calls them, from the State of primitive Innocence †; and ſuppoſe, that if Man had preſerved the *original* Perfection of his Nature, Providence would have found out ſome *purer* way of propagating the Species than by the groſs *Senſe of Touch* ‖; a Happineſs vouchſafed to the *Brute* Cre-

* Par. L. B. IV. 742.

† So St. *Baſil.* Tom. 1. Ει δε μη εκ παρεργυ και κατα τον παραδεισον και τον εκει θειον τον Αδαμ επισκεψαιο, ευροις αν αυτον εν μεν παραδεισω μη χρειαν εσχηκοτα γνωναι ἑαυτης την γυναικα, μετα δε την παραβασιν, και τον θανατον, και την εκπτωσιν της παραδεισυ, τοτε την γυναικα γινωσκοντα. *De vera Virginitate.* p. 771. ed. Par. Of the ſame Opinion was St. *John Chryſoſtom.* Μαλλον δε ἡ παρθενια μεν εξ αρχης και της γαμυ προτερα ἡμιν εφανη, δια ταυτα δε επεισηλθεν ὑστερον ὁ γαμος, και πραγμα αναγκαιον ενομιζετο ειναι, ὡς ειγε εμεινεν ὑπακουων ὁ Αδαμ, ουκ αν εδεησε τουτυ. και πως αν, φησιν, αἱ τοσαυται μυριαδες εγενοντο;—ειτε ὑυτως, ειτε ἑτερως, ουκ εχω λεγειν. το γαρ ζητυμενον νυν, ὁτι γαμυ ουκ εδει τω Θεω προς το πολλυς ποιησαι της επι γης ανθρωπυς. *De Virg.* Tom. 4. p. 331. ed. Par. vid. & p. 328. So St. *Jerom* writing to *Euſtochium.* Eva in Paradiſo virgo fuit: poſt pelliceas tunicas initium ſumpſit nuptiarum. p. 35. And in his firſt Book againſt *Jovian.* Ac de Adam quidem & Eva illud dicendum, quod ante offenſam in Paradiſo virgines fuerint; poſt peccatum autem, & extra Paradiſum, protinus nuptiæ. Lib. I. p. 160. If this Father ever commends Marriage 'tis upon this very indirect view of it. Laudo nuptias, laudo conjugium, ſed quia mihi virgines generant. (*Epiſt. ad Euſt.* ub. ſup.) lego de ſpinis roſam, de terra aurum, de conchâ margaritam.

‖ *Milton*, B. VIII. 579.

ation,

ation, in common with ourſelves, as a Mark of its pretended *Unworthineſs*; whereas the *Angels*, a nobler Claſs of Beings, and to whom it is ſaid we are one day to be *equal*, are repreſented to us *neither to marry, nor be given in Marriage* *; as an inſtance of their ſuperior Perfection and Dignity.

ADMITTING it to be ſo, (interpoſed I) I ſee no Merit in our aſpiring to be *as the Angels* before our time; 'tis rather a *Deſertion* of our proper Poſt and Duties, and a kind of *breaking in* upon the natural Order of things †.

THAT (returned *Hortenſius*) is the obvious Tendency of all ſuch fanciful Re-

* *Mat.* 9. 30. *Luk.* 20. 36.

† This ſhews the Weakneſs of St. *Baſil*'s Reaſoning upon this Point. Ει γαρ εν τη αναστασει ουτε γαμουσι ουτε γαμιζονται, αλλ' εισιν ως αγγελοι, και οι την παρθενιαν ασκουντες αγγελοι εισιν, εν ευφθαρτοις σαρξι τον των ανθρωπων βιον περιπολουντες. και αγγελοι ουκ ασημοι τινες, αλλα και σφοδρα επιφανεστατοι. ατι εκεινων ανευ σαρκων κατα τον ουρανον την αφθαρσιαν, τοπω και αβιαστω φυσει παρα τω παμβασιλει των ολων θεω φυλαττοντων, ουτοι επι γης σαρκιναις ηδοναις ενοχλουμενοι, και τη πειρα τε διαβολε εκκειμενοι, την αφθαρσιαν εσαγγελον δι αρετης τω ποιητη παραδοξοτερον διεφυλαξαν. *De vera Virg.* p. 767. And yet this is a very common Topic amongſt the Fathers in commendation of Virginity, that, quod alii poſtea in cœlis futuri ſunt, hoc virgines in terrâ eſſe cœperunt. *S. Hier. adv. Jov.* Lib. 1. 178.

finements.

finements. They remove us out of our *appointed* Province, and put us into a *different Claſs* of Being from that which God and Nature have deſigned us for. And where can be the Excellence of thus *intruding* ourſelves into a Character that does not *belong* to us? In reality, *Philemon*, I ſee not how it can be ſaid to be a *Perfection* in *Angels* to live *above* thoſe Injoyments of *Senſe* for which they have neither *Capacity*, nor *Inclination*: at the moſt, it is rather a Privilege or Conſequence of their *incorporeal* Nature, than any *meritorious* Act of their Will *. Certainly however it cannot

* For that the Angels μη γαμυσι μη δε εκγαμιζονται, St. *Chryſoſtom* gives a very ſufficient Reaſon, (as different as his Application of it may be) when he adds that ουκ εισι συμπεπλεγμενοι σαρκι και αιματι, ουδε επι της γης εχυσι τας διατριβας, ουδε οχλον επιθυμιων ανεχονται. *De Virg.* p. 322. Tho' indeed to reconcile this with the Sentiments of another more antient Father I cannot ſo well undertake, who explains a Paſſage in the fourth Chapter of *Geneſis*, and another in St. *Paul*'s firſt Epiſtle to the *Corinthians*, of Angels entertaining a Paſſion for Women. Si mulier, ſays *Tertullian*, poteſtatem habere ſuper caput debet, (1 *Cor.* 11. *v.* 10.) vel eo juſtius virgo, ad quam pertinet quod in causâ eſt. ſi enim propter angelos, ſcilicet quos legimus a Deo & cœlo excidiſſe ob concupiſcentiam fœminarum; quis præſumere poteſt tales angelos, *maculata* jam corpora, & humanæ libidinis *reliquias* deſideraſſe, ut non ad *virgines potius* exarſerint, quarum *flos* etiam humanam libidinem excuſat? nam & ſcriptura ſic ſuggerit, &c. *Tertull. de Virgin. veland.* 177. The Father, we ſee, has a very refined Notion of angelical In-

cannot be *ſuch* in Man to forego any of thoſe natural Pleaſures which his Creator has marked out for him in the very *Condition* of his Being, as *proper Means* of his preſent Happineſs; and accordingly has made his Duty to conſiſt not in the *Renunciation* of his Senſes, but in the *regular Uſe* and *good Government* of them. 'Tis the Excellence of any Being not to ſoar *above* its natural Sphere, but to act well and wiſely *within* it. *Human* Perfection is the Perfection of a *Man*, and not that of an *Angel*. Had Men ſufficiently attended to this plain and obvious Diſtinction, what a Multitude of illiberal Superſtitions, and uncouth Practices in Religion, had never been heard of? but the quite contrary Notion has generally prevailed where Religion has been any part of Men's Concern; and accordingly the World has been pretty much divided between ſuch as have had *too much* Religion, and ſuch as have had *none at all* *; the latter of theſe Characters being indeed a natural Conſequence of

Intriguing. Seriouſly, I know not whether it be more abſurd, thus to bring down the Angels to the level of human Paſſions, or to affect to exalt the human Nature into the State and Condition of Angels: both, I am ſure, are without the leaſt Foundation either in Reaſon or Scripture. But Fathers are not always the beſt Friends to either of theſe.

* It was the juſt Complaint of *Pliny* in his time, aliis nullus eſt deorum reſpectus, aliis pudendus. *Nat. Hiſt.* Lib III. cap. 7.

the

the former *: for whatever an over-forward Zeal may ſuggeſt to People of more *Piety* than *Underſtanding*, all Attempts to raiſe any *part* of Duty too high are in effect ſetting the *whole* much too *low*; whilſt by indeavoring to fetter Men with too *great Reſtraints*, we only provoke them to throw off *all*; and fly to abſolute *Irreligion*, as the only Security againſt the Incroachments of *Bigotry*.

THE Exchange (ſaid I) is very raſh and unwarrantable. Nevertheleſs, ſuch are the Abſurdities of ſome religious Syſtems, that one cannot wonder that a ſtrong Diſguſt to theſe ſhould ſometimes tranſport Men of *freer Spirits* too far, whilſt by a haſty Aſſociation of Religion itſelf with their own nurſery Prejudices concerning it, they are led to diſcard both at the ſame time †. Upon any

* Ἡ δε δεισιδαιμονια τη αθεοτητι και γενεσθαι παρεσχεν αρχην, και γενομενη διδωσιν απολογιαν, ουκ αληθη μεν, ουδε καλην, προσφασεως δε τινος ουκ αμοιρον νοειν. *Plut. de Sup.* p. 171.

† Whilſt ſome Opinions and Rites (ſays an excellent Writer of our own) are carried to ſuch an immoderate Height, as expoſes the Abſurdity of them to the view of every body but them who raiſe them, not only Gentlemen of the Belles Letters, but even Men of common Senſe, many times ſee thro' them; and then out of Indignation, and an exceſſive renitence, not ſeparating that which is true from that which is falſe, they come to deny both, and fall back into

any other Hypotheſis it ſeems difficult to account for ſome Men's irreconcileable Enmity to Religion, whoſe natural Diſpoſitions are ſuch as might incourage one to hope much better things from them. But the miſtaking *Reverſe of wrong for right* is a very common Deceit; and Men have need of great Caution and Sobriety of thinking to keep clear of it.

For what to ſhun will no great Knowledge need,
But what to follow, is a Taſk indeed *.

'Tis this (returned *Hortenſius*) that is the very Deluſion of thoſe Refiners we were ſpeaking of. Becauſe they are not left at liberty to purſue all the *Extravagancies* of their natural Appetites, therefore they will not allow of any innocent *Gratifications* of them: as if there was no middle way between *Voluptuouſneſs* and *Inſenſibility*; and a Man muſt either *renounce* his animal Nature, or be a *Slave* to it. What is this, *Philemon*, but to *miſtake reverſe of wrong for right* in the moſt glaring inſtance? and for fear of degenerating into *Brutes*, to diſdain to act in Character as *Men?* For certainly if there had been any

into the contrary Extreme, a Contempt of all Religion in general. *Relig. of Nat. del.* p. 60, 61.

* Mr. *Pope*'s Epiſt. to my Lord *Bathurſt*, 201.

Crime in *Senſuality* as *ſuch*, our Creator would never have placed us in ſuch Circumſtances, as to fall under *inevitable* Guilt this way, by the neceſſary Condition of our very Being, every moment of our Lives: a Conſideration which ſome rigid Aſſertors of Mortification would do well to attend to, before they impoſe their own Viſions upon the World under Pretences of ſuperior Sanctity.

I ſuppoſe (ſaid I) they are only ſome *particular kinds* of Senſuality, which are uſually taxed as immoral; for otherwiſe the neceſſary Condition of our very Being itſelf were a State of *perpetual* Immorality. An Imputation that would reflect no ſmall Diſhonour upon the Author of it!

THEY are ſo, (replied he) but 'tis the Effect of a very ſhort and ſcanty way of thinking. For ſince theſe *particular* Species of Senſuality are condemned as *immoral*, without any regard to *civil*, or *ſocial*, or *perſonal* Inconveniences that may ariſe from them, it muſt be only as they have the Nature of *ſenſual Indulgences*. And then what hinders but every other Indulgence of this ſort ſhould be equally condemned with theſe? And thus we are reduced to this unavoidable Dilemma——Either there is no Evil in Senſuality as *ſuch*, or

or there is——If the former be true, then we muſt give ſome *other* Account of the Immorality of the forbidden kinds, than what ariſes from their Senſuality; and ſo indeed we ſhall have a fair way open to proceed in; but withal ſuch an one as muſt intirely deſtroy the Foundation of theſe pretended Refinements in Morality. ——If the latter, then will it become us to take care, leſt by indeavoring to throw off an *imaginary Blemiſh* from *ourſelves*, we caſt a *real* one upon the Purity and Perfection of our *Maker*.

WHAT think you (ſaid I) of the Paſſion of *Shame*, that is an Attendant upon *ſome kinds* of ſenſual Indulgences? Does not this ſeem to argue an *intrinſic* Turpitude in the Acts themſelves; a ſort of conſcious ſenſe of ſome *moral Incongruity* in the very Nature of the particular Pleaſures? And yet *Grotius*, I remember, ſpeaks of the *Pudor circa Res Veneris*, as one of the moſt general Principles in our Nature *. And indeed the Character of Senſuality ſeems to have been in a peculiar degree appropriated to Pleaſures of *this* kind; and they are uſually branded by moral Writers with ſuch particular Epithets of *Infamy*, as if they were of a more

* *De ver. Relig. Chriſt.* Lib. I. Sect. 7.

groſs and debaſing nature than any of the other Pleaſures of Senſe.

WITHOUT entering (ſaid *Hortenſius*) into the *Original* of this Paſſion of Shame, or determining whether it be *natural*, or *acquired*, a Queſtion, as I apprehend, not without its Difficulties; the *Uſe* of it, I think, in Society is very evident. It lays a commodious Reſtraint upon a violent Paſſion, the *public* Gratification of which would be attended with many civil Inconveniences; whilſt, inſtead of *participating of the Myſteries of Love*, as the incomparable Mr. *Wollaſton* ſpeaks, *with Modeſty, as within a Veil or ſacred Incloſure* *, we ſhould be in the Situation of thoſe deſcribed by the Poet,

Quos Venerem incertam rapientes more ferarum
Viribus editior cædebat †.

A Circumſtance happily prevented by the means of this uſeful Paſſion.

YOU are not then of the Opinion of that learned Caſuiſt, (returned I) who accounts for the Shame attending theſe Pleaſures of the *ſixth Senſe*, as he is pleas'd to call them,

* *Rel. of Nat.* p. 180.
† *Hor.* Sat. Lib. 1. Sat. 3. 109.

from

from their *diſangelical Nature.* Not that they have any *intrinſic Turpitude* in them; but being below the *Dignity* of the Soul of Man deſigned for an *angelic* Life, "Nature, ſays he, has taught her to *ſneak*, "when *ſhe being Heaven-born demits her-*"*ſelf to ſuch earthly Drudgery* *.

IF I was to give any further Account of this matter than I have already done, (replied *Hortenſius*) I ſhould think the Hypotheſis of the very ingenious Mr. *Hutcheſon* the moſt natural: who ſuppoſes that an Opinion of the *Selfiſhneſs* of theſe Indulgences, ariſing from their *confined* Nature, is the Ground of our being aſhamed of them; and that this *firſt introduced Ideas of Modeſty into polite Nations* †: but however they firſt came there, certain it is they deſerve the Incouragement of every Society; nor can the Public be too cautious in keeping up a tender ſenſe of them in the Minds of Men, as a Guard to their Virtue; and in diſcountenancing whatever Diſcourſes, Books, Repreſentations, *&c.* are found to have a contrary Effect. But this, as I before obſerved, upon a merely civil or ſocial Account; the only *juſt* Ground, as I apprehend, of the *Unlawful-*

* Letters Phil. & Mor. between Mr. *Norris* and Dr. *More*, p. 153, 168.

† *Hutch.* Inq, 325. Sect. 5,

neſs even of the *forbidden* Species of Senſuality. It being better upon the whole, that particular Men ſhould be under *ſome* Reſtraint in the Gratification of their natural Appetites, than that much *greater* Miſchiefs ſhould happen to Society, in Conſequence of a general *Licentiouſneſs*. For as to the *diſangelical Nature* of theſe particular Pleaſures, beſides that it muſt hold equally of the moſt *allowed* Inſtances of them, as of the *prohibited* ones, it is with me, I muſt own, of very little weight againſt *any* of them; and that for this plain Reaſon, becauſe *Men* are not *Angels*; and therefore no ſuppoſed Perfections of *their* State of Being can be proper Matter of Example to *us*, who are placed in quite different Circumſtances *. The Caſe is the

* It ſeems a very odd way of depreciating the Pleaſures of the ſixth Senſe, as they are called, to ſay they are *diſangelical*: for is not this as true of thoſe of the other five Senſes? Whatever the learned Doctor may think of the *Food of Angels*, which he ſomewhere ſpeaks of as literally *ſuch*, or *the fragrant Odors of Paradiſe*, (p. 169.) we have the Authority of a reverend Father of the Church to produce againſt him in this Point. Speaking of the Angels, ουδε σιτου δεονται (ſays he) και ποτου, ουδε μελος αυτους ηδυ μαλαξαι δυναιτ' αν, ουδε οψις επικαμψαι λαμπρα, ουδε αλλο των τοιουτων ουδεν. αλλα καθαπερ τον ουρανον εν μεσημβρια ςαθερα μηδενος ενοχλουντος νεφους εςιν ιδειν καθαρον, ουτω και τας εκεινων φυσεις, ουδεμιας ενοχλουσης επιθυμιας, μενειν αναγκη διαυγεις και λαμπρας. *S. Chryſoſt.* de Virg.

Tom.

the ſame in the *moral* World, as it is excellently repreſented by the Poet to be in the *natural*;

On ſuperior Powers
Were we to preſs, inferior might on ours;
Or in the full Creation leave a void,
Where, one Step broken, the great Scale's deſtroy'd.
From Nature's Chain whatever Link you ſtrike,
Tenth, or ten thouſandth, breaks the Chain alike *.

As to thoſe reproachful Epithets with which, as you obſerve, moral Writers affect to ſtigmatize ſenſual Pleaſures, as if the fault lay in the *things themſelves*, and not rather in the *Degree*, or other *Circumſtances* of them: I anſwer with the ingenious Mr. *Norris* in his Theory and Re-

Tom. 4. p. 322. The great Pagan Poet had likewiſe juſter Notions of Immateriality.

Ου γαρ σιτον εδουσ' ε πινουσ' αιθοπα οινον,
Τυνεκ αναιμονες εισι, και αθανατοι καλεονται.

Hom. Il. IV. 341, was his Account of his Heathen Divinities.——So that were we to indeavor after a Life *ſtrictly angelical*, (and if we are required to do ſo in *one* Inſtance, why not in *another?*) we muſt become in very truth like the *Idols* of the *Heathen* (Letters as before) *have Eyes and ſee not, Ears and hear not, Noſes and ſmell not*, Palates and taſte not, *Hands and handle not*——A Scheme of Perfection I am not enough ſpiritualiz'd to envy any Man.

* *Eſſay on Man*, I. 233.

gulation

gulation of Love, that " *herein is their* " *Miſtake.* And if Men will talk con- " fuſedly of things, and aſſign *falſe* Cauſes " for *true* ones, who can help it * ?

I am glad (interpoſed I) you have the Authority of ſo approved a Divine to bear you out in this Notion; otherwiſe was you to communicate your Thoughts to many People I could name, you muſt expect to be charged with the moſt abandoned *Epicuriſm.*

I hope (returned he) I have a better Authority for my Opinion than that of any great Name whatſoever, the Authority of Truth and good Senſe. For to go a little farther into this Subject——Whoever will be at the pains of examining into the Nature and Reaſons of moral Obligation, may, I think, ſoon ſatisfy himſelf, that the *proper Duty* of any moral Agent is nothing elſe but its *proper Happineſs.* The Terms are convertible, and imply each the other. If with this view we conſider Man, as he is in himſelf, a Creature of a *mixed* Conſtitution, made up of a *ſenſible*, a *ſocial*, and a *rational* Principle, 'tis obvious that the *proper* Happineſs or Good of ſuch a Being, or which is the ſame thing, the greateſt *Perfection* of his

* *Theory*, &c. p. 98.

Nature,

Nature, muſt ariſe out of ſome certain Scheme of Action at once ſuited to all the parts of this *compound* Character. Here, *Philemon*, commences the general Reaſon of all human Morality and Religion. It is not, as we are too often taught to think it, a ſet of *arbitrary* Injunctions impoſed upon us at the mere voluntary Appointment of a capricious Superior: but a Rule of Conduct founded in our very *ſelves*, and reſulting out of the Make and Conſtitution of our Nature. Away then with all thoſe viſionary and fantaſtic Refinements which would teach us to build our *Virtue* upon the Ruins of our *Humanity*, and eradicate *one* of the *eſſential Parts* of our Nature to accompliſh the *other*. 'Tis in ſome juſt Balance of our *whole* Conſtitution, not in the Deſtruction of any *Branch* of it, that our main *Perfection*, becauſe our main *Happineſs*, conſiſts. The Gratification of our Senſes and Paſſions, merely *as ſuch*, is no more a Crime, than the Exerciſe of our Reaſon, or the Offices of ſocial Affection *: for each of theſe were alike given us by the great Author of our Faculties, as ſo

* Even the Deſire of public Good may be too ſtrong in ſome heroic Tempers, whilſt the Agent never thinks he can do enough to promote it, but without reflecting upon his paſt Conduct, like the ambitious, goes on

Nil actum reputans, ſi quid ſupereſſet agendum.

Lucan.

many *diſtinct* Principles of Action, ſo many *ſeveral* means of Happineſs; and, *Philemon*,

What compoſes Man, can Man deſtroy *?

It then only becomes *wrong*, when either from an *undue Meaſure*, or *improper Circumſtances*, it breaks the Harmony of our internal Frame; and by too great an Indulgence of *one* of theſe Principles offers violence to *either* of the *other*. We are not, as the incomparable Mr. *Wollaſton* ſpeaks, to " give up the *Man* to humor " the *Brute*, nor to hurt *others* to pleaſe " *ourſelves* †;" but where we can keep clear of ſuch *accidental* Inconveniences, there the Pleaſures of Senſe are as allowable, as they are made neceſſarily grateful to us. They are, like the Trees of Paradiſe, not only *fair* to the Eye, but *good* for Food. For indeed, as Mr. *Norris*, I remember, very juſtly ſtates the Point; " Where " there is no Malice in it either againſt " God, Himſelf, or his Neighbour, I can- " not imagine how it ſhould be at all a " moral Incongruity for a Man to *pleaſe* " *himſelf* ‖.

BUT

* *Eſſay on Man*, II. 164.

† *Rel. of Nat. del.* p. 180.

‖ *Letters Phil. and Mor.* p. 149. Excellent are the Sentiments of the Author before-cited upon this Head. *Temperance*, ſays he, permits us to take Meat and Drink not only as Phyſic for Hunger and Thirſt, but

But does not Scripture itſelf (ſaid I) ſeem to authoriſe a different way of Reaſoning

but alſo as an *innocent Cordial* and Fortifier againſt the Evils of Life, or even ſometimes, Reaſon not refuſing that Liberty, *merely* as matter of Pleaſure. *Chaſtity* does not pretend to *extinguiſh* our tender Paſſions, or cancel one part of our Nature, it only bids us not indulge them againſt Reaſon and Truth. *Frugality* indeed looks forward, and round about; but ſtill it forbids no Inſtance of *Generoſity*, or even *Magnificence*, which is agreable to the Man's Station and Circumſtances. *Rel. of Nat. del.* p. 179, 180. as before. Within theſe juſt, and neceſſary Regulations, founded in our very Nature and Conſtitution, we may admit the Pleaſures of the Senſes to be really deſirable, without that falſe Conſequence in *Tully* of wiſhing in voluptate maximâ, nullo intervallo interjecto, dies, nocteſque verſari; cum omnes ſenſus dulcedine omni quaſi perfuſi moverentur: for, as the Paſſage goes on, quis eſt dignus nomine hominis, qui unum diem totum velit eſſe in iſto genere voluptatis? *de Fin.* Lib. II. p. 188. ed. Dav. Such a Happineſs as this is the Happineſs of a merely *ſenſible* Being only, not of a *ſocial*, or a *rational* one. How contemptible an Idea does the Pagan poetic Theology give one of the ſupreme *Jupiter*, when it repreſents him, as *Seneca* has it, voluptate concubitus delinitum duplicaſſe noctem! *De Beat. Vit.* 516. It was the want of this Diſtinction that gave riſe to the different Extravagancies of the *Stoics* and *Epicureans*, upon this Article of ſenſible Pleaſure. "Neither ſide conſidered Men, as Men, "but as it were divided human Nature between them. "The latter, forgetting themſelves to be moral A-"gents, regarded only Senſibility; the former, for-"getting themſelves to be ſenſible Beings, regarded "only Morality." *Balguy*'s Tracts, p. 204. A wiſe Man may very well be of that noble Sentiment in *Tully*, ne malum quidem ullum, nec ſi in unum locum conlata omnia ſint, cum turpitudinis malo com-

ſoning upon this Queſtion? does it not frequently charge Immorality upon ſome kinds of ſenſual Pleaſure, as *ſuch*, without any mention of Conſequences? and accordingly ſpeak of them in terms that carry an Imputation of *Baſeneſs* and *Turpitude* in the very *Nature* of the *Acts themſelves*, as if they were not ſo much Offences againſt the *ſocial Intereſts* of Mankind, as againſt the *perſonal Dignity* of human Nature? Thus they are repreſented under the Character of *Luſts which war againſt the Soul* *, of *filthy Luſts* †, *of vile Affections* ‖, and the like. And Fornication is ſtiled the Sin of *Uncleanneſs*, and treated as a *Defilement* of a Man's *ſelf*, rather than as an *Injury* done to his *Neighbour* ‡.

paranda, (*Tuſc. Diſ.* ed. Dav. 132.) without carrying the Point to ſuch an extreme as that, lætetur in perferendo; or thinking there is no Difference between being in Phalaridis Tauro, and in Lectulo. *Ibid.* p. 121. *Plutarch*, with his uſual Good Senſe, has excellently decided this matter, Ἡδονης δε πασης μεν περιεχεσθαι, και παντως, αλογιστον εστι, πασαν δε φευγειν, και παντως, αναισθητον. Con. ſep. Sap. 158.

* Αιτινες στρατευονται κατα της ψυχης. 1 Pet. 2. 11.

† Μολυσμα σαρκος. 2 Cor. 7. 1.

‖ Παθη ατιμιας. Rom. 1. 26.

‡ Παρεδωκεν αυτους ὁ Θεος εις ακαθαρσιαν, τω ατιμαζεσθαι τα σωματα αυτων. Rom. 1. 24.——Πορνεια δε, και πασα ακαθαρσια. Eph. 5. 3.——Φευγετε την πορνειαν. ὁ πορνευων εις το ιδιον σωμα αμαρτανει. 1 Cor. 6. 18.

In all Paſſages which look this way, (replied *Hortenſius*) we muſt ſuppoſe the Caſe of *inordinate Affection* * to ſenſual Pleaſure to be taken into the Account; and ſo the fault will lie not in the *Kind* of Indulgence, but in the *Meaſure* of it. For otherwiſe the *ſame kind* of Pleaſure could not be lawful under *any* Circumſtances, and *Marriage* itſelf would be as immoral as *Fornication*, contrary to an expreſs *Precept* of one of the inſpired Writers †. Unleſs it may rather be thought, that the ſacred Writers ſpeak of theſe Matters, as they are known to do of many others, with Accommodation to *popular* Uſage, and common ways of Expreſſion; being more ſollicitous to guard Men againſt the *Breach* of their Duty, than to inſtruct them in the *preciſe Reaſons* of it ‖. And indeed to inforce the

* See *Norris*'s Theory and Reg. p. 99.

† For ſo, I think, that Paſſage in the *Hebrews* ſhould be rendered, τιμιος ὁ γαμος εν πασι, *let Marriage be honorable in all Men*; with Analogy to the preceptive Stile of the whole Chapter. Thus it begins, ἡ φιλαδελφια μενετω. της φιλοξενιας μη επιλανθανεσθε. v. 1, 2. and ſo it goes on throughout. See *Heb.* 13. v. 4.

‖ It muſt be owned there is a very great Authority, that of the able and judicious Mr. *Locke* in his Comment upon the following Words of St. *Paul*, 1 *Cor.* 6. 18. ὁ πορνευων εις το ιδιον σωμα ἁμαρτανει, againſt this Opinion. He ſuppoſes the Apoſtle to make uſe here of an Argument againſt Fornication to Chriſtians, taken from their particular Relation to Chriſt, conſider'd in his

the *Practice* of Morality was a buſineſs of much greater moment to them, than nicely to adjuſt the *Theory* of it. This was

his glorified State. His Expoſition is this—— " He " who committeth Fornication ſinneth againſt the " end for which his Body was made; namely, to be " a Member of Chriſt, and to be raiſed to the ſame " Power which he has now in Heaven," (*Locke*'s Works, Fol. 2 vol. p. 168.) for ſo he underſtands the fourteenth Verſe, και ὑμας εξεγερει δια της δυναμεως αυτυ.——But if this be a good Argument to Chriſtians againſt Fornication, it muſt be ſo too againſt Marriage: for the mere Act of *corporal Indulgence* is the ſame in both States, and there is only a Difference in the Circumſtances of it, which is here no part of the Apoſtle's Conſideration. He reaſons upon the Nature of the Act itſelf; but ὁ κολλωμενος τη πορνη ἑν σωμα ες-ιν, is as true of ὁ κολλωμενος τη γυναικι; ſo that in both Caſes it is αιρειν τα μελη τυ Χρις-υ κτλ equally; if this be indeed the true Ground of the Prohibition we are here conſidering. But with all due Deference to ſo judicious an Interpreter in moſt Caſes, I think, he had acted more agreably to that rational Ingenuity he has ſhewn upon other occaſions, if, inſtead of reſting in an Explication which is liable to infinite Difficulties, he had here, as he does elſewhere, frankly owned, " what the meaning of theſe Words is, I " confeſs, I do not underſtand;" (ſee his Note on 1 *Cor.* 11. 10.) For my own part, I am intirely at a loſs to give any ſatisfactory Senſe to this Paſſage. Unleſs it might be allowable to underſtand by *Body*, with the Editor of the New Teſtament in *Greek* and *Engliſh*, the *Body of Chriſtians*, the *Church*, or *myſtical Body of Chriſt*, ſo often mention'd in Scripture; againſt which *Fornication* is in a *peculiar* ſenſe a Crime from its near Connexion with the impure Services of Pagan *Idolatry*; into many of which it had been, as it

was rather the Province of Philoſophy, and improved Reaſoning; and had accordingly given Imployment to the ſeveral eminent Maſters of it in different Ages and Countries; but the other was a Point of too great difficulty for any *human Authority* to compaſs; and therefore was the peculiar Aſſignment of thoſe who ſtood inveſted with *divine:* who came not, as they themſelves inform us, with the Arts of Eloquence, the *inticing Words of Man's Wiſdom*, but *with Signs, and Wonders, and divers Miracles, Demonſtrations of the Spirit, and of Power* *. But this is a matter that will fall more immediately under Conſideration in the Sequel of this Argument; for the preſent it may ſuffice to have juſt hinted at it in paſſing, in bar to

it were, incorporated. So ſays *Tertullian*, who introduces Idolatry thus reporting of herſelf, Ego quidem Idololatria ſæpiſſime mœchiæ occaſionem ſubminiſtro; ſciunt luci mei, & mei montes, & vivæ aquæ, ipſaque in urbibus templa, quantum evertendæ pudicitiæ procuremus. *De Pud.* p. 557. It was yet more eminently criminal in this view, when practiſed, as we are informed it too often was, by Chriſtians, in their religious Aſſemblies themſelves, in their Night-Meetings at the Tombs of their Martyrs; inſomuch that an early Council thought fit to injoin, "that Women "ſhould not frequent theſe Cœmeteries by Night; eo quod ſæpe ſub obtentu orationis latenter ſcelera committantur. 35 *Can. Conc. Elib.*——But if this be not admitted, we muſt, I think, have recourſe to popular Accommodation in this Place.

* 1 *Cor.* ch. 2. v. 1. & 4. *Heb.* 2. 4.

ſuch

ſuch Objections as might be ſuppoſed to ariſe from the Quarter of Revelation againſt the main Tenor of theſe Reflections.

To proceed to ſome farther Obſervations that more directly confirm it. We have already conſidered the State and Conſtitution of Nature, as it is an immediate Occaſion of many pleaſing Perceptions to the human Senſe. Nevertheleſs the Pleaſures of the *Senſes* are by no means the *only* ones to which it is ſubſervient; there are others of a more elegant kind, that ariſe out of theſe, and open a ſtill wider field of Entertainment to us; the Pleaſures, I mean, of the *Fancy* or *Imagination*. Under this Head I comprehend thoſe ſeveral delightful Perceptions which ariſe from the Contemplation of either natural, or artificial, or even imaginary and ideal, Objects, conſider'd as *beautiful*, *regular*, *harmonious*. That theſe are ſomething very different from the *ſimple Senſations* of our Sight, or Hearing, is generally, I believe, acknowledged; inſomuch that a celebrated Writer upon the Subject is for conſidering them as a *diſtinct* Claſs of Perceptions; and calling our Power of receiving them an *internal Senſe* *. Thus much is certain, that a Man may enjoy

* *Hutch.* Inq. p. 17.

all

all his ordinary Senſes in great Perfection without any of thoſe tranſporting Pleaſures that gratify a refined Imagination. In *Muſic* we ſeem to admit a Diſtinction of this ſort in our common Language; by ſtiling a Capacity for the Pleaſures of Harmony, a *good Ear*. And yet the Organs of Hearing ſeem to be by no means leſs perfect in People of no Genius for Muſic, than in others of the greateſt and moſt improved Fancy this way. And why a *good Eye* might not ſound full as well of a Judgment in *Painting*, *Statuary*, *Architecture*, or *natural Landſcape*, I can ſee no reaſon but want of Uſe and Cuſtom. Doubtleſs theſe are as diſtinct Ideas from the ſimple Perceptions of *Color*, *Figure*, and *particular Extenſion*, as the others are from the particular Tones of *ſingle Notes*. A Man may be able to diſtinguiſh theſe with great Accuracy, may know all the Varieties of harſher, ſofter, higher, lower, flatter, ſharper, when diſtinctly ſounded to him, and at the ſame time have no Ear for *good Compoſition* in Muſic. In like manner he may know with ſufficient Accuracy the particular Dimenſions of any Body, its Length, Breadth, Height, Baſe, Surface, Angles, Circumference, and yet have no Reliſh of that *general Proportion* which is the Reſult of the *whole*, and charms the Virtuoſo Spectator without any previous

Inquiry. So again in a Piece of Painting he may diſcern all the ſeveral Objects, their diſtinct Figures, their Attitudes, their Colorings, with the different Boundaries and Degrees of Light and Shade; and yet have no Senſe of its *general Beauty*. It is this that ſets the *Man* of *Taſte* in the ſeveral polite Arts ſo much above the *mechanic* Performer. Both of them may have the ſame number of ſeparate Ideas from the ſeveral *Parts* of any Object; and yet the former ſhall have a quite different Perception of the *Whole*, from what the latter has any notion of. As to the Foundation of this Senſe of Beauty, 'tis obſerved, I think, very juſtly by the ingenious Mr. *Hutcheſon* to be "*Uniformity amidſt Va-*" *riety*," or the Contemplation of an Object as at once regular, and diverſified. Whether there be any real Excellency in the particular Forms we call regular to the Eye of a ſupreme Intelligence is not ſo eaſy to determine; tho' was I to declare for either ſide of the Queſtion, I ſhould rather do it for the negative. Thus much however is very certain, that the Conſtitution of Nature is every way as much accommodated to the Entertainment of our *internal Senſe* of Beauty, as it has been ſhewn under a former Article to be to that of our *ordinary Senſes*. The Univerſe, as its very Name imports in the Language of

the

the Antients, is a Syſtem of *Beauty*, *Regularity*, and *Order* *. But the Pleaſures of Imagination are of a much wider extent than the real Compaſs of *external* Nature; for having once received the Ideas of *Beauty* and *Proportion* from the ſeveral Objects of immediate Senſe, it finds within itſelf a Power of inlarging, compounding, and altering them at pleaſure to any aſſignable Degree, and of figuring to itſelf new Combinations and Forms of beautiful Objects, to be as ſo many Models of Practice in the different Branches of Art, which not only adminiſter freſh Acceſſions of Delight to the Imagination of the Curious, but alſo contribute much to the better Accommodation, or Imbelliſhment of human Life. And here again, *Philemon*, as if Providence could never enough manifeſt its kind Intentions for our Happineſs, it has not only form'd an intire Univerſe with *reference* to our *Taſte* of Beauty, and put us into a capacity of multiplying the Sources of this Pleaſure to ourſelves by numberleſs artificial Combinations, and Models of our own Invention; but moreover, by a ſtill more complicated Benevo-

* So *Pliny* tells us in his ſecond Book of Natural Hiſtory, chap. 4. Equidem & conſenſu gentium moveor, nam quem κοσμον Græci, nomine ornamenti, appellaverunt, eum nos, a perfectâ abſolutaque elegantiâ, mundum.

lence, has ſuperadded to the ſeveral Objects of *original Beauty*, neceſſarily *agreable* to us in their own Nature, a power of becoming yet farther *ſo* by after *Deſcription*; and made the *apt Repreſentations* of pleaſing Forms a *diſtinct* Ground of Entertainment from the Pleaſure of the Forms themſelves. 'Tis to this we owe much of the Entertainment of Poetry, Painting, Sculpture, Statuary, and other deſcriptive Arts *.

'Tis very remarkable, (ſaid I) that this *comparative* Beauty from the *Aptneſs* of *Deſcription* is no ſmall Foundation of Pleaſure to the Imagination, even where the Objects deſcribed are rather *diſagreable*, or even *terrible*, in themſelves. Thus particular Deformities either of Perſon, or in natural Objects; the decrepit Figure of Old Age, rude Rocks, Mountains, Precipices, Tempeſts, may by a good Repreſentation be turn'd into very conſiderable Beauties in Painting, however otherwiſe in their Realities. And no one, I believe, ever read *Virgil*'s Deſcription of *Æneas*'s Deſcent to Hell without a very ſenſible Delight, tho' the ſeveral Scenes he was to paſs thro' in his Paſſage thither were conſidered by his *Conductreſs* as ſo full of Horror, that ſhe would not permit him to ingage in the

* *Hutch.* Inq. Sect. 4.

unpa-

unparallel'd Enterprize, 'till ſhe had given him this very ſeaſonable piece of Caution along with him——

Tuque invade viam, vaginâque eripe ferrum;
Nunc animis opus, Ænea, nunc pectore firmo.*

Tho' it muſt at the ſame time be owned, the Pleaſure is ſtill greater, when we attend him to the——

Locos lætos, & amœna vireta
Fortunatorum nemorum, ſedeſque beatas†.

Becauſe there the Objects *themſelves* are no leſs agreable to the Imagination, than the Poet's ſingular Happineſs in repreſenting them. The *Spectator*, I remember, has the ſame Obſervation of our own divine Countryman *Milton*; " that his Deſcrip-
" tions of Hell and of Paradiſe are both,
" perhaps, equally perfect in their kind;
" but in one the Brimſtone and Sulphur
" are leſs refreſhing to the Fancy, than
" the Beds of Flowers, and Wilderneſs of
" Sweets in the other ‖.

How inlarged and amiable an Idea (interpoſed *Hortenſius*) does this give us of the beneficent Contrivance of the Author

* *Æneid.* Lib. VI. 260.

† Ibid. 638.

‖ Vol. VI. N°. 418. The intire Eſſay on the Pleaſures of the Imagination is well worth peruſing upon this Subject.

of

of our Faculties? that in the Syſtem of the Univerſe he ſhould have obſerved the ſame Rule which we ourſelves do in regard to our own perſonal Syſtem: *having given*, as an inſpired Writer has it, *more abundant Honour to that part which lacked?* inſomuch that even thoſe Objects in Nature, which *we think to be leſs* beautiful, *upon theſe are beſtowed* an adventitious kind of *Beauty*, and its *uncomely Parts* have thus a relative *Comelineſs* *.

But is not this after all (obſerved I) as much as can be ſaid, according to your Hypotheſis, of the moſt confeſſedly beautiful Objects in Nature? for you ſeemed unwilling, I remember, to admit of any ſuch thing as *abſolute intrinſic* Beauty; and were for reſolving all into a certain arbitrary Accommodation of things to our particular manner of Conception: ſo that what I have ſometimes heard remarked of a particular Species of Beauty, that of Face, or Perſon, is as true, I perceive, of every other kind of it; and our Men of *Gallantry* are better Philoſophers, than they themſelves are generally aware of, when in defence of ſome ſingular Paſſion they tell us, that "all Beauty is Fancy." But ſurely, *Hortenſius*, this cannot be the Truth of the Caſe; that there ſhould be no ſettled Cri-

* 1 Cor. 12. 23, 24.

terion

terion of *Beauty*, *Order*, *Proportion*, in the Nature of things themſelves, independently of ſome *ſpecial* Appointment. Who can imagine, that a rude Heap of Stones confuſedly thrown together ſhould, to the Eye of any Being, appear equally beautiful with a fine piece of Building, the Proportions of the moſt regular *Architecture?*

THIS is a mere Prejudice of our Imagination, (returned *Hortenſius.*) Can you ſeparate all Thoughts of *Uſe* from the particular Models of Architecture, which you call beautiful? or is not this latter Conception a Conſequence of the former, in ſome ſecret Method of Aſſociation?

BY no means, (ſaid I) as I apprehend. How often do we commend an Object as beautiful, where Uſe is quite out of the queſtion? where there is not any Appearance of this kind to determine our Approbation?

NOR any *Compariſon* (replied he) made with ſome other Object of like Beauty, that is confeſſedly uſeful?

I think not, (ſaid I) at leaſt I have often done ſo, without being aware of any ſuch Compariſon.

PERHAPS

PERHAPS ſo, (returned *Hortenſius.*) But this is not the only Inſtance, in which Compariſons are formed by the Mind without any *immediate* Attention to its own Act in doing ſo. What think you, *Philemon*, of that Propenſity we all naturally have to run to the Aſſiſtance of People in any ſudden and immediate Circumſtance of Danger or Diſtreſs? Could you ſee a Man accidentally falling into the Fire, or down a Precipice, in danger of Drowning, Suffocation, Strangling, or the like, and not *mechanically* indeavor to reſcue him? And yet, perhaps, this piece of neceſſary Compaſſion may be only a more diſguiſed Inſtance of Self-Love grounded upon a *ſudden*, and therefore *unobſerved* Subſtitution of *ourſelves* into his Place and Circumſtances. 'Tis the Quickneſs of the Tranſition in ſuch Caſes that makes us overlook it. And hence probably ſeveral other acquired Propenſities in our Nature either to perform certain Actions, or to reliſh certain Objects, without a *formal Attention* to the preciſe Reaſons of either, have been diſtinguiſhed by the name of *Inſtincts*, whereas in truth they are only *Habits*. Tho' at the ſame time it muſt be acknowledged, that they have all the Uſe and Force of ſo many ſeveral Inſtincts; and therefore the particular Facts that

ariſe

ariſe out of them are not affected by any difference in accounting for the *Original* of the things themſelves. May not this explain in ſome meaſure your approving certain Objects as beautiful, where you can ſee no Uſe; namely, from ſome unobſerved Compariſon with *like regular Forms*, which are experienced to have a very manifeſt one? For indeed, *Philemon*, to talk of *abſtract Order* and *Proportion* is to me very unintelligible Language. As far as Order and Proportion are *real Qualities* of Bodies, and not arbitrary *Modifications* of our Senſe, they belong equally to all poſſible Combinations of Matter. For the moſt *deformed irregular Objects* have a certain Order and Relation of their Parts to one another, as well as the moſt beautiful and uniform ones. Let a heap of Stones be thrown together never ſo *confuſedly* as to our Apprehenſion, there will yet, as an ingenious Writer expreſſes it *, "be as real a Proportion in their Sizes "and Diſtances, as if they had been "ranged by the niceſt hand;" and the Reaſon why they appear confuſed to us is not becauſe they want Order and Proportion in *themſelves*, but becauſe they have not that *particular* Order and Diſpoſition of Parts that is accommodated to our par-

* Author of a Pamphlet, intitled, *Divine Benevolence*, in 1731, printed for *J. Noon*, p. 46.

ticular manner of Conception. 'Tis not Order and Proportion as *ſuch* that conſtitutes Beauty; for then all Objects that may be compared as to Situation and Quantity muſt be beautiful; and there could be no ſuch thing as Deformity in the World. We are indeed apt to pronounce of certain diſagreable Objects, that they want Order and Proportion; but the Expreſſion is juſt as improper, as the fore-mention'd Author obſerves, as when we ſay a Body is *ſhapeleſs*, which appears to us *ill-ſhaped* *. If you was to invert the Poſition of the beſt-proportioned Door-Caſe, and make its Perpendicular its Baſe, would it not appear extremely awkard and unnatural? Now what is it that is here changed, but its particular Relation to the human Stature? the ſame Number of Parts, and the ſame Order and Proportion of one of its Dimenſions to the other, ſubſiſts as before; Upright and Parallel are mere Prejudices of our Senſe. The only thing that is really affected by this Alteration is its *Uſe* or *Convenience*; and yet when it loſes this it is no longer beautiful: a Circumſtance that ſeems to make Beauty and Uſefulneſs more nearly allied to each other, than you are willing to allow. And, to ſay the truth, *Philemon*, I am of opinion this way of Reaſoning holds equally good of the ſe-

* *Div. Ben.* p. 47.

veral

veral Forms of Beauty in *Nature*, as in the Combinations of *Art*. The wiſe Architect of the Univerſe has framed every part of it with exquiſite Contrivance to promote the general good of the whole. The Configurations of the heavenly Bodies, their Order, Magnitudes, Diſtances, Revolutions, are all of them accommodated to their reſpective Uſes in the Creation. The Structure of Plants, Trees, Animal Bodies, *&c.* is ſuch as their ſeveral Natures require it ſhould be. Were we let into the whole Secret and Oeconomy of Nature, we ſhould find none of them could be altered but for the worſe. Our *Reaſon*, and our *Intereſt*, from a general View of the Caſe, would approve their *preſent Conſtitution*, tho' we had no *Senſe of Beauty* in any particular Mechaniſm more than another. And yet ſuch is the Abundance of Divine Goodneſs, that not ſatisfied, as it were, to have formed things for the *beſt* in a rational Eſtimate, it has given them a *ſupernumerary* Recommendation to us from a Principle of Beauty; and made the Contemplation of ſuch Forms, Orders, and Diſpoſitions of Bodies, as would moſt approve themſelves to our Reaſon *as uſeful*, an immediate Source of Pleaſure to our Imagination *as beautiful*. For this I take to be the real State of the Caſe; and it is an effectual Anſwer to thoſe who

tell us, that upon Suppoſition there is no *intrinſic Beauty* in the Nature of Things themſelves, but all is matter of arbitrary Appointment, the Profuſion of *Art* and *Skill* obſervable in the Mechaniſm of the Univerſe is a mere *Waſte of Workmanſhip*; and a *Chaos* would have anſwered the Creator's Purpoſe as well as a *regular Syſtem* *: a Notion that can never be maintained, 'till it can be proved that *all Conſtitutions* of Things are as indifferent in reſpect of their *Uſes* and *Applications*, as I have been indeavoring to ſhew they are, in reſpect of the particular Conſideration of their *Beauty*.

But will not this way of Reaſoning, (ſaid I) *Hortenſius*, lead us to ſome very odd Concluſions? particularly, if there be no *Reality* in *Beauty*, and nothing can appear to the divine Mind otherwiſe than it *really* is in itſelf, will not this ſeem to caſt a ſhade upon the univerſal Syſtem in the Eye of its own Maker? Shall then the lovely Face of Nature, ſo liberal of its Charms to the human Senſe, appear notwithſtanding to its Author, the only *unerring Judge* of it, without *Form* or *Comelineſs* †? A ſhocking Reflexion this on that *Divine Geometrician*, as an ancient

* Divine Rectitude, by Mr. *Balgy*, p. 16.
† Iſaiah 53. 2.

Author

Author calls him, who has ever been conſidered by the wiſe and thoughtful of all Ages, as eſtabliſhing the Univerſe in *Number, Weight, and Meaſure*; and who tells us of himſelf, by a more authentic Declaration, that upon a deliberate Review of the Works of his Hands, newly gone out of them, he found reaſon to pronounce of every thing he had made, *that it was very good* *. And indeed I have always been uſed to conceive of the Beauty, Order, and Regularity of external Nature, as the Production of thoſe perfect Models of Beauty, Proportion, and Symmetry into actual Exiſtence, which before ſubſiſted in the divine Ideas from all Eternity. But you, it ſeems, will neither allow them to ſubſiſt there, nor any where elſe, but in the *deluded* Apprehenſions of weak Mortals.

MAY I ever be thus agreably deceived, (reſumed *Hortenſius!*) and with Gratitude, inſtead of repining, ſubmit to a Deluſion of ſo great Conſequence to my Happineſs! For what is Happineſs, *Philemon*, but Idea? and if imbracing a *Cloud* can give me *equal Satisfaction*, need I complain of its being *ſubſtituted* in the room of the *Queen of Heaven?* But to come more directly to the Point: You are concerned,

* Geneſis 1. 31.

it

it ſeems, that the Works of the Deity ſhould appear to him without that *particular Relation* we call *Beauty*. But do they not likewiſe appear to him without the *relation* of *Deformity*? and does not that in ſome meaſure ſatisfy you? Should I tell any of the Vulgar, that there is no ſuch thing as *Color* to the divine Apprehenſion, would not their Prejudices ariſe ſtrong againſt the Truth of this Aſſertion? and yet you and I are perſuaded of this, and think it no Diminution of the *divine* Happineſs, however the contrary may be an Improvement of our *own*. Do but conſider Beauty, as you are uſed to do Color, *Philemon*, and you will be as little concerned to defend the Reality of one, with regard to the Deity, as you are of the other *.

BUT not to urge you with leſs important Objections, (replied I) *Hortenſius*, I have one which ſtrikes deep at your main Principle, taken from Fact; namely, that the Conſtitution of Things is itſelf *ſuch* as plainly ſpeaks the Deity to have had a regard to the greater Order and Harmony of the World, as a *diſtinct* End from the Happineſs of its Inhabitants. What elſe, as a very ingenious Writer upon this Subject reaſons, means that Scale and Subor-

* *Div. Ben.* p. 45.

dination

dination of Beings eſtabliſhed in the Univerſe, "aſcending from inanimate and "ſtupid Matter to Human-Kind, and "reaching beyond it higher and farther "than our Faculties are able to follow "them *?" A more nearly *equal* State of their Powers and Perfections would have been more conducive to their common Happineſs, but would at the ſame time have deſtroyed that Order and Regularity which prevails in the preſent Syſtem; an End too *ſacred* for the Deity to break in upon for any other Conſiderations †! Had Happineſs been the only Deſign of the Creator, whence that mighty *Difference* to be obſerved in the Capacities and Injoyments of the ſeveral Ranks of ſenſitive Beings? why were they not all placed in the *higheſt* Degree of Perfection? why not all *intelligent?* why not indued with the Powers and Faculties of *Angels?* but the eternal Laws of Order and Proportion forbid ſuch an *unvaried* Diſpoſition of Things ‖.

THIS (returned *Hortenſius*) would be an inſuperable Difficulty indeed, were it but built upon any ſolid Foundation in point of Fact: but what if the quite

* *Div. Rect.* p. 13.
† *Div. Rect.* p. 22.
‖ *Div. Rect.* p. 15, 22, 23.

contrary be true? What if the *ſame* Conſtitution and Oeconomy of things that makes them thus *beautiful* and *regular* to our Imagination, be at the ſame time calculated to ſerve the Purpoſes of the greateſt poſſible *Happineſs* upon the whole? How do you know but the higheſt Order of intelligent and happy Beings may in the preſent Syſtem be as *full*, as the Nature and Circumſtances of *ſuch* Beings can admit of? Would you then have no *inferior* Degrees of Happineſs communicated to other Claſſes of Beings, becauſe a *farther* Communication of that which is moſt perfect is altogether impracticable? Surely this would be to break in as much upon the Happineſs of the Univerſe, as it can be ſuppoſed to be upon its Order and Regularity. Seriouſly, *Philemon*, I am ſo far from thinking the Scale of Beings you mention an *Objection* to the Creator's Goodneſs, that to me it appears to be the nobleſt Diſplay and Confirmation of it; inaſmuch as it ſeems probable the *Sum total* of Happineſs is much greater in this Conſtitution of things, than it could have been in any other *: eſpecially if this *very* Circumſtance

* This Notion is well explained and defended by the learned and thoughtful Archbiſhop *King*, in his Treatiſe of the Origin of Evil; and his Reaſonings upon this Subject have been ſtill farther inforced by his very ingenious *Tranſlator*; who in this, as, I think,

in

ſtance of a regular Subordination in the Univerſe, at the ſame time that in the nature of the thing itſelf it is productive of more general Happineſs, be likewiſe calculated to give Pleaſure in its Contemplation from a *Senſe of Beauty* to *other* parts of the rational Creation, as we experience it to do to *ourſelves* in *particular*; a Notion which I do not think improbable: however, it muſt be owned, the Conſtitution of our Senſe of Beauty may ſeem to have been in many reſpects more *peculiarly* accommodated to

in many other Inſtances, has greatly improved upon an excellent Original. See Chap. 3, 4, 5. Subſect. 5. with the Notes; from which I will take the liberty of tranſcribing the following Paſſage—— "From the "foregoing Obſervation, that there is no manner of "*Chaſm* or *Void*, no Link *deficient* in this great Chain "of Beings, and the reaſon of it, it will appear ex- "tremely probable alſo, that every diſtinct Order, "every Claſs, or Species of them, is as *full* as the "Nature of it would admit, and God ſaw proper. "There are perhaps *ſo many* in each Claſs as could "exiſt *together* without ſome *Inconvenience* or *Uneaſi-* "*neſs* to each other. This is eaſily conceivable in "Mankind, and may be in ſuperior Beings; tho' for "want of an exact Knowledge of their ſeveral Na- "tures and Orders, we cannot apprehend the man- "ner of it, or conceive how they affect one another; "only this we are ſure of, that neither the Species, "nor the Individuals in each Species, can poſſibly be "infinite; and that nothing but an *Impoſſibility* in "the nature of the thing, or ſome greater *Inconve-* "*nience*, can reſtrain the Exerciſe of the Power of "God; or hinder him from producing ſtill *more* and "*more* Beings capable of Felicity." *Law*'s Tranſlat. p. 95. Note 35. at the end.

Creatures of our *particular* Make and Circumſtances. Thus the Manner of knowing by *general Theorems*, and of operating by *general Principles*, or *Cauſes*, as 'tis well obſerved by Mr. *Hutcheſon*, as far as we can attain it, muſt be moſt ſuitable to Beings of limited Underſtanding, and Powers of Action; the one preventing Diſtraction to their Minds by a Multiplicity of particular Propoſitions, and the other Toil and Wearineſs to their active Faculties from a Variety of ſeparate Applications *. Now 'tis obvious that our Senſe of *Beauty* coincides intirely with what a rational Conviction of *Intereſt* would recommend to our Choice in both theſe Inſtances. Again, the Comprehenſion of regular and uniform Objects is much *eaſier* than of irregular ones; inaſmuch as here a Knowledge of one or two parts leads us into that of the whole; whereas the Ideas of confuſed Heaps, and diſuniform Combinations are neither aſcertained to the Imagination, nor retained in the Memory, without conſiderable *Difficulty* †. And yet here likewiſe a Senſe of *Beauty* comes in, and determines us in favour of Uniformity, Regularity, and Order in the Diſpoſition

* *Hutch.* Inq. p. 98.
† *Hutch.* p. 99.

of

of Objects previouſly to all Reaſons of Convenience *.

It may be obſerved here, that however it muſt be acknowledged that none of theſe Reaſons have any Force as to the ſupreme Being *himſelf*, ſince all ways of knowing are

* The Meaning here is, that from an actual Experience of the Benefits of Order, Uniformity, Regularity, in many particular Inſtances, we are led to place a kind of Value in regular Objects *as ſuch*, in the way of Habit and Aſſociation. For that this is the very truth of the Caſe in *natural* Objects we may reaſonably conclude from the Analogy of *artificial* ones; in which it is very evident that *Beauty* is nothing elſe but experienced *Uſefulneſs*. Many of the *Ornaments* in the different Orders of Architecture were at firſt only very ſimple Contrivances for the convenient Adjuſtment of Beams, Rafters, Props, and other neceſſary Materials in building; as may be ſeen in *Vitruvius*, and other Writers of Architecture: by degrees *Uſe* came to be converted into *Beauty*; and indeed the latter ſeems now wholly to ingroſs the Paſſion of the *Virtuoſi*, as it were for its own ſake. Thus the *Corona* or *Corniſh* particularly was at firſt only an Invention to keep off Wet from the Sides of Walls, or Bodies of Pillars; and yet we ſee it is now eſtabliſh'd into an *Ornament*: ſed *projectura Coronarum* rejiciet extra perpendiculum ſtillas, & ea ratione ſervaverit integras lateritiorum parietum ſtructuras. *Vitruvii* de Architecturâ Lib. 2. Cap. 8.——So again the Proportions between the Baſes of Pillars and their Heights were at firſt adjuſted from that of the Foot to the intire Stature in the human Body. Cum voluiſſent columnas collocare (ſays *Vitruvius*) ſpeaking of the firſt Inſtitution of the *Doric* Pillar, non habentes ſymmetrias earum, & quærentes quibus rationibus efficere poſſent, uti & ad *onus ferendum* eſſent idoneæ, & in

are equally *eaſy* to an infinite Comprehenſion, and all ways of acting to infinite Power; nevertheleſs, he having determined for the Reaſons already mentioned to conſtitute our Senſe of Beauty *ſuch* as in fact it is, an *Accommodation* of external Nature to it is what might reaſonably be expected from

aſpectu *probatam* haberent *venuſtatem* (a manifeſt Conſequence *this* of the *other*) dimenſi ſunt virilis pedis veſtigium, & cum inveniſſent pedem ſextam partem eſſe altitudinis in homine, ita in columnam tranſtulerunt.——The Proportions of the *Ionic* and *Corinthian* Pillar were adjuſted much upon the ſame Principle. *Vitruv.* Lib. 4. Cap. 1. *de Gen. Columnarum.*——And in another Place he tells us, that all Proportion in Building is relative to that of the human Figure. Non poteſt ædes ulla ſine ſymmetriâ atque proportione rationem habere compoſitionis, niſi uti ad hominis bene figurati membrorum habuerit exactam rationem. Lib 3. Cap. 1. And indeed that the Ancients were wholly governed by the Views of the greateſt Uſe or Conveniency, when they, omnia certâ proprietate, & à veris naturæ deductis moribus, traduxerunt in operum perfectiones, (*Vitruv.* Lib. 4. Cap. 2.) appears from hence, that later Architects have in vain attempted to refine upon their Models, or to introduce any *new Orders* of Building. The late *French* King, we know, was very deſirous to have had the Reputation of bringing ſome *new Order* into uſe; but it was found impracticable without manifeſt Inconvenience.——I may here juſt note by the way, that what has been ſaid of *natural* Beauty, that it is all *relative* to ſome Uſe, is as true of *moral*, or the Beauty of *Actions*. Some *Scheme* of Action there is which anſwers *all* the Purpoſes of *ſuch* a Creature as Man; which accompliſhes *every* Point he can be ſuppoſed to aim at. This is what is called *moral Virtue*, and it is the *Duty* of every Man, becauſe it is his true *Intereſt* upon the whole, to act

from his Goodneſs *. Accordingly we find the Univerſe has been a perpetual Source of Delight and Entertainment to the Imaginations of the Curious in all Ages.

act in Conformity to this Rule of Life and Conduct, eſtabliſhed in the neceſſary Relations and Habitudes of things. The Senſe of *Beauty* in *Actions* is nothing elſe but their *apprehended Subſerviency* to this great End; which, according as it is *juſt* or *otherwiſe*, conſtitutes (as the Senſe of external Beauty does likewiſe in natural Objects) a *true* or a *falſe Taſte* of Life. This accounts for the many *otherwiſe unaccountable Perverſions* both of the *internal* and *moral* Senſe obſervable in Fact and Experience; as it likewiſe points out the true Remedy for them, namely to conſider impartially the real Nature and Conſequences of Things, to inlarge the View of the Mind, to take in many more Particulars into the Account, and by that means correct the *vicious* Reliſh or *Gothic* Taſte. Thoſe who cannot give up the favorite Terms of *abſtract Beauty*, and *abſtract Fitneſs*, may poſſibly have leſs Prejudice to this way of thinking, when they are pleaſed to obſerve, that what they call *beautiful*, or *fit*, and the like, that I only deſire leave to call *uſeful*, or *convenient*; we mean the very ſame things, and differ only in Expreſſion: a Circumſtance I chuſe to mention, in regard to the many excellent Writers who have ſeemed to oppoſe the *intereſted* Scheme of Morality. I have as great a Contempt for what is *commonly* underſtood by *Selfiſhneſs*, as they can poſſibly have; and I am leſs inclined to differ from them, becauſe, I take it, it is the *Exceſs* of their *Generoſity* alone that, to my Apprehenſion, miſleads them; this having been the Error, if ſuch it is, of ſome of the moſt valuable Perſons in the World of Letters; as no one can doubt, who conſiders that Dr. *Clarke*, Mr. *Wollaſton*, Mr. *Hutcheſon*, Mr *Balguy*, and others of great Merit have declared for this Opinion.

* See *Hutch.* Inq. p. 102.

That

That admirably *ſimple* kind of Mechaniſm, by which are brought about ſome of the moſt conſiderable Effects in Nature is exquiſitely adapted to our Taſte of Beauty in *Uniformity amidſt Variety*. Such are the Principles of Gravitation, of Heat, of Elaſticity; the ſeveral Operations of which, beſides their numberleſs good Uſes in the Creation, have moreover a *peculiar* relation of Accommodation to the human Mind, from their obſerved *Agreement* in one general Cauſe of their Production. The obvious Face of the World, *Philemon*, is beautiful and regular; the Forms of the heavenly Bodies, their Diſpoſition in an imaginary concave Sphere, their Periods, and Revolutions in equal Times; the Returns of Day and Night, Seed-time and Harveſt, Summer and Winter; the Arrangements of natural Objects; the gradual Riſing of Hills, their extended Ranges with regularly interſperſed Valleys; the beautiful Level and poliſhed Surface of Rivers; the uniform Majeſty of the Ocean; the ſimilar Structure and Configuration of the parts of Flowers, Plants, Trees, and above all of animal Bodies, are Inſtances of a *governing Order* in Nature equally notorious and agreable. But this beautiful Simplicity, Regularity, and Order in the Conſtitution of things is not intended merely to indulge us in the *lazy* Pleaſure of Contemplation,

temptation, but to ſuggeſt to us many uſeful Principles of Action and Imployment. The ſeveral kinds of natural Forces abovementioned by a dexterous Application are made ſubſervient to various good Purpoſes in the Accommodation of Life *. To them we are indebted for the Coheſion of the ſeveral Parts of artificial Compoſitions of Bodies; for the Theory and Application of the mechanic Powers; for many uſeful Operations in Chymiſtry, Phyſic, Surgery; the ſeveral Engines imployed in the raiſing, projecting, or drawing off Water and other Fluids; the Invention of Clock-work, and the different Uſes of Springs; with ſeveral other Particulars too numerous to be here

* It is to be obſerved here, as I find it well repreſented by Mr. *Campbell*, that we do not in ſuch Applications create to ourſelves any new Powers or Faculties, which we had not before from the Author of our Being; nor do we furniſh external Objects with other Qualities, than what they have from the firſt Cauſe of all things. And where is the Crime of my collecting and diſpoſing particular things together, ſo as to gratify my Mind with greater Variety of pleaſing Perceptions than can be had in common thro' the World? All theſe things are fitted and appointed by the Author of Nature to entertain me with ſuch Gratifications: and, I hope, there is no Guilt in exerting my natural Powers, and making uſe of my own Labour, Skill, and Induſtry, in procuring for myſelf thoſe Pleaſures which I have a natural Taſte to injoy; or in applying things to thoſe Purpoſes, to which, not ſinful Man, but the Deity himſelf has ſo well adapted them. ΑΡΕΤΗ-ΛΟΓΙΑ, p. 111, 112.

diſtinctly

distinctly insisted on *. Our Taste of Beauty in the Order and Regularity of natural Objects is the Foundation of all that Pleasure we receive from the more *elegant* Devices of Art; such as *Architecture*, *Music*, *Gardening*, *Painting*, *Statuary*; to which we may add likewise the Pleasures of *Dress*, *Equipage*, *Attendants*, *Furniture*. Without some or other of which Pursuits, Life would want many of those Conveniences, and most of those Amusements, for which alone it is chiefly valuable, in the Opinion of such as would be esteemed to have the truest Relish of it. Strike off the artificial Improvements of Life, and you leave little or no Advantage in a great Fortune above a very small one. The Beauties of Nature lie open to all in common: the substantial part of all sensual Gratifications is attainable by a very moderate share of Wealth and Power: nay, even Scarcity often recommends these things to us much more than Abundance. Would we *refine* upon the common Satisfactions of Life, and strike out into a

* The Appointment of general Principles in Nature is farther useful in a *higher*, a *moral* Account. For were there no general Laws established, "there "could be no Prudence or Design in Men, no ra- "tional Expectation of Effects from Causes, no "Schemes of Action projected, nor any regular "Execution." *Hutch.* Inq. p. 103.

more

more *varied* Scene of Injoyments than lie within the Reach of the Vulgar, we muſt call in the Improvements of *Fancy*, as what alone can compaſs this Point for us. Accordingly, if we look abroad into the World, and reflect a little what it is that ſo attracts our Eyes and our Envy in the higher Stations of Life, ſhall we not find it to be only the ſuperior Capacity they give to People of more diſtinguiſh'd Rank for injoying the ſeveral Pleaſures of *Decency*, *Regularity*, *Beauty?* Why elſe is the Pride and Magnificence of a *Palace* preferred to the Humility of a plain and cleanly *Cottage?* a Piece of *Painting* to an ordinary *Sign-Poſt?* a Suit of *Embroidery* to a Covering of *Frize?* a Service of *Plate* to a Set of *earthen Diſhes?* a numerous *Attendance* to a *Table*, or a *Dumb-Waiter?* a *Concert* of *Muſic* to a Company of *ruſtic Scrapers?* an *Opera* to a *Village-Wake?* If you ſay that Conſiderations of *Property* determine our Choice here, I anſwer, Property *alone* cannot do it; for then a *Miſer* would be thought equally happy with a Man of the moſt *accompliſhed Taſte*. It muſt be Property *applyed* to ſomething we eſteem *Happineſs*. Even the *Miſer himſelf*, tho' at preſent by a ſtrange Infatuation in the Paſſion of Avarice his Thoughts look no farther than Poſſeſſion, commenced ſuch probably at firſt from a

Proſpect of Happineſs. 'Twas the Apprehenſion of *Want*, that is, of not having the *Means* of *injoying* Life in his power, that ingaged him in this *ſaving* Regimen: unleſs we may ſuppoſe that even *yet* he has an eye to the *making a Family*, as 'tis call'd; that is, laying a Foundation for *others* to taſte thoſe *very* Pleaſures of *Order*, *Regularity*, *Beauty*, from which the Wretch himſelf is eternally precluded from a cheriſhed Horror of Expence *.

WHETHER this be any part of his Intention or not I cannot tell, (interpoſed I) but it certainly often ſucceeds ſo in Fact. Profuſion in the ſubſequent Generation is generally a ſort of Retribution to the Public for the Miſchiefs of Avarice in the precedent one. I remember Mr. *Pope* in his Epiſtle to my Lord *Bathurſt* has given this Thought a very beautiful Dreſs in the following Lines——

Riches, like Inſects, when conceal'd they lie,
Wait but for Wings, and, in their Seaſon, fly:
Who ſees pale Mammon pine amidſt his Store,
Sees but a backward Steward for the Poor;

* See this Subject well treated in *Hutch.* Inq. Sect. 8. p. 93, &c.

This

This Year a Reſervoir, to keep, and ſpare;
The next, a Fountain ſpouting thro' his Heir.*

But after all, (continued I) *Hortenſius*, if Self-Denial be ſo neceſſary a Token of Virtue as 'tis ſometimes repreſented, who knows but the *Miſer*, as deteſtable a part as he is generally eſteemed to act, may yet have a ſort of Claim to the Character of the moſt *conſummate* Virtue? a ſtrange Paradox this! But yet it is certain he practiſes as high a Degree of Abſtinence from all the Comforts of Life, as the moſt mortified *Aſcetic* can pretend to. He ſacrifices his *all*, *Hortenſius*, and can the other boaſt of doing more? nay, in one reſpect, he is even the *greateſt Rigoriſt* of the two; for he ſacrifices at leaſt *one* Pleaſure more than the *Aſcetic* himſelf does; the Pleaſure, I mean, of *Liberality*.

As far as *Intention* is concerned (ſaid *Hortenſius*) I am of opinion he may do ſo. Nevertheleſs, *Philemon*, the *Conſequences* both of the *Miſer*, and the *Aſcetic-Paſſion*, are nearly the ſame; both theſe ſorts of People may be ſaid *to leave their Wealth to others* †, and give up their own Right in their Poſſeſſions, that ſomebody elſe may be the better for them. How different are

* Epiſt. of the Uſe of Riches, l. 170.
† Pſalm 49. 10.

the Cauſes that may thus bring about the ſame Effects? No one is apt to ſuſpect a *Miſer* of Liberality, or an *Aſcetic* of Covetouſneſs; and yet they both act the very ſame part in Life, tho' upon quite contrary Principles; they both *deny themſelves* in the very ſame Inſtances. To ſuffer Want thro' the Fear of Want, which is the Caſe of the former, is, it may be, the more *flagrant* Abſurdity; but to imbrace it voluntarily, and for its own ſake, as does the latter, is ſurely no *inconſiderable* one; eſpecially in a Conſtitution of things, as has been ſhewn, no ways favourable to ſuch an auſtere Sentiment of religious Perfection.

BUT would you carry this Notion ſo far, (ſaid I) *Hortenſius*, as abſolutely to condemn the forward Zeal of thoſe mortified Pietiſts, who taking the evangelical Precept of *ſelling all we have, and giving to the Poor* *, in a ſtrictly literal Senſe, imbrace the Severities of voluntary Poverty, as if it was as formally impoſſible, as it is ſomewhere by a ſtrong proverbial Expreſſion in Scripture declared to be extremely difficult, in certain Circumſtances, for *a rich Man to enter into the Kingdom of Heaven* †?

* *Mat.* 19. 21. compare with *Mark* 10. 21.
† See as before.

INDEED,

INDEED, (ſaid he) *Philemon*, I would. There cannot be a greater Injury to the Honour of the ſacred Writings than to ſuppoſe them capable of an Interpretation, in any particular Paſſage, ſo repugnant to *Common Senſe*, no leſs than to the *general Tenor* of thoſe very Writings themſelves.

BUT may not this, and other like Places of Scripture (I interrupted) be underſtood as certain *Counſels* of *eminent Perfection* to *ſome* People, no ways obligatory as matter of *ſtrict Duty* upon *all?* I think I have ſomewhere met with this Diſtinction in religious Writers.

POSSIBLY you may, (replied he) but 'tis a Diſtinction without the leaſt Foundation of Reaſon to ſupport it. Whatever the Scriptures propoſe as a Counſel of real *Perfection*, muſt, to all who believe them, be matter of ſtrict *Duty*; for all Chriſtians are bound to become as *perfect* as they can. Admitting then that *voluntary Poverty* is any part of Chriſtian *Perfection*, there will be a real Obligation upon all Chriſtians to ſubmit to it *. And thus muſt

* The learned *Barbeyrac* obſerves well upon this point, Chrétiens, comme tels, ne pourront qu' aſpirer à une telle perfection. Ils le devront meme, contre ce que

muſt the whole Chriſtian World be reduced to a *level*, all obliged to a State of *Beggary*; and the ſeveral Diſtinctions of Civil Society, with the relative Duties ariſing out of them, muſt intirely vaniſh wherever the Goſpel is once introduced. A ſtrange Repreſentation of things, *Philemon*, and moſt unworthy the ſuppoſed Author of Revelation! And yet unleſs this be allowed, I ſee not how it can be any Merit in People to whom Providence has allotted the Diſtinctions of Birth and Fortune to quit their *proper Poſt* and *Duties*, and *beggar themſelves*, in order to adminiſter to, what upon their own way of Reaſoning they muſt needs think, the *ſuperfluous Indulgences* of *other* People. I remember to have read of a very rigid Pietiſt, the celebrated *Mademoiſelle Bourignon*, who upon this very Principle, tho' ſhe made little uſe of her Wealth in her own Perſon, would never be prevailed upon to diſtribute it in Charity to any body elſe. She could find no *fit Objects* upon whom to beſtow her Liberality; none who would not make an ill uſe of it in adminiſtring to their *Idleneſs*, or their *Vices*; " nullos adhuc inveni

que l'on ſuppoſe. car toutes les exhortations des Ecrivains ſacrez tendent à impoſer l'obligation indiſpenſable de ſe perfectioner, & de ſe rendre chacun de plus en plus agréable à Dieu. *Traité de la Morale des Peres, chap.* 8 *ſect.* 15.

" vere

" vere pauperes," was her conſtant Reply to all Requeſts of this nature *. Tho' the Principle ſhe went upon, as indeed moſt of her other Principles, was extremely *wrong*, yet ſhe certainly reaſoned *right* in *conſequence* of it. For what it becomes me to renounce *myſelf*, I can have no Authority to transfer to *other People*. And yet certainly, *Philemon*, this is not the Meaning of the Apoſtle, where he exhorts, *that to do good, and to communicate, we ſhould forget not* †: nor in another of his Epiſtles, where he charges *them that are rich in this World, that they do good; that they be rich in good Works; ready to diſtribute* ‖.——— So different is the Morality of the Goſpel from the Refinements of fanciful Enthuſiaſts.

BUT to go a little farther into this Point. Admitting that the only lawful Uſe of Riches is, as our Apoſtle ſpeaks, to *do good, to be rich in good Works*, I ſuppoſe it can be no Diminution of any Act of Be-

* Vellem ut occaſionem haberem bona mea ad gloriam Dei impendendi; tunc ne uno quidem die retinerem; ſed nullam hucuſque inveni: multi ſunt qui ea acciperent, ſed non impenderent ad gloriam Dei, ut ego facere deſtino. *ap. Seckend. Apolog. Relatio.* p. 78, 79. See *Bayle's* Dict. Vol. 1. under the Article *Bourignon*, Remark M.

† Heb. 13. 16.

‖ 1 Tim. 6. 17, 18.

neficence,

neficence, that it is contrived ſo as to be at once a Benefit to the *Author*, no leſs than to the *Object* of it. If at the ſame time that I am ſupplying the Wants of *others*, I can ſo order the Matter as to anſwer many good Purpoſes to *myſelf* in the way of private and perſonal Accommodation, is the Charity of ſuch a Procedure at all leſſened by its thus turning to a *double* Account? Surely, *Philemon*, there can be no Pretence to think ſo. Now 'tis in this View that I would look upon Men of Rank and Fortune in Life, as Inſtruments in the hands of a kind and good Providence to adminiſter to the Neceſſities and Occaſions of thoſe who move in a lower Sphere, from the united Principles of *Generoſity* and private *Intereſt*. Their perſonal Recreations and Amuſements, the Expences of their Station and Circumſtances in the World, their very Luxuries, and moſt elegant Superfluities, (if you will needs call every thing by that Name, that is not immediately neceſſary to our very Being) tho' they are far from what a celebrated Author calls them, *private Vices*, as *ſuch*, do anſwer however to the other part of his Deſcription of them, and both are, and ought to be imployed as, *public Benefits* *.

They

* *Fable of the Bees, or private Vices public Benefits.* This falſe Notion of confounding Superfluities and Vices,

They are the proper Incouragements of *honeſt Induſtry*; a kind of Tax upon the Liberality of thoſe who are exempted by their ſuperior Situation in Society from the Drudgeries of its more ſervile Offices. They find Work and Maintenance for the labouring Poor, ſo neceſſary in all Communities; are the Support of many uſeful Trades and Imployments in the middle Stations of Life; the Foundation of a more extended Commerce both at home, and with foreign Nations; of that general Circulation of Property, by which, in the wiſe Appointment of things, the Abundance of a *few* is made ſubſervient to the Exigencies of the *many*. Where this View takes place, ſuch a *generous Oeconomy* of our Pleaſures *ſanctifies*, as it were, the very *Nature* of them: it adds a *Merit* to Expence, converts *Ornament* into *Uſe*, and *Elegance* into *Charity*. For my part, *Philemon*, I know not a more enviable Character than that of a truly great Man who, by a Generoſity of thinking anſwerable to his ſuperior Capacity of doing good, imploys his Fortune to all the Purpoſes of a *magnificent Liberality*; like a good Angel, a kind of guardian Deity, to his Fellow-Creatures, diffuſing Happineſs far and wide

Vices, is what runs thro' that whole Piece; otherwiſe, (as all that Author's Pieces are) very ingeniouſly written.

thro' a numerous Circle of grateful Dependents; whilſt, at the ſame time, by a wonderful Proviſion in Nature to reward ſo ſerviceable a Benevolence, the very *Objects* of his *Bounty*, are the *Inſtruments* of his moſt *valuable Gratifications*. There is nothing, *Philemon*, I have obſerved to be more generally miſtaken in a religious Account than the Notion of Charity: many People ſeem to conſider *Alms* as what alone deſerves that Name. As if it was not a greater, a more godlike Benevolence, to put the ſame Perſons *above* the hard Neceſſity of aſking our Alms, than it is to relieve them upon their actual Application for them *. To be touched with the *immediate* Symptoms of Wretchedneſs is no very high Degree of Excellency: he is a Scandal to his Kind who is not ſo. But to concert *calmly* and *ſedately* the moſt effectual

* The humane Moraliſt *Seneca* was of a very different opinion——Optimum eſt, ſays he, antecedere deſiderium cujuſque: proximum ſequi. illud melius, occupare antequam rogemur: quia cum homini probo ad rogandum os concurrat, & ſuffundatur rubor, qui hoc tormentum remittit, multiplicat munus ſuum. Non tulit gratis, qui cum rogaſſet, accepit. *De Ben. lib.* 2. *cap.* 1. And again, *cap.* 2. Moleſtum verbum eſt, oneroſum, & demiſſo vultu dicendum, rogo. Hujus facienda eſt gratia amico, & cuicunque, quem amicum ſis promerendo facturus. ſero beneficium dedit, qui roganti dedit.——It may perhaps be, that that very circumſtance is the *chief Recommendation* of this kind of Charity, which with many People is made an *Objection*

effectual Meaſures of doing good, as it were, before it is even ſought for, to cheriſh the fair Idea in our Minds, and by friendly *Precautions* of Benevolence to hinder, as far as may be, the very *Entrance* of Miſery into the World, this is indeed a truly heroic Inſtance of Virtue. And yet this is the very part which every Man of Diſtinction and Affluence is called upon to act, if he does but rationally conſult his own greateſt Entertainment and Happineſs. Such is the *Morality* even of *Pleaſure*, *Philemon*, in a true Eſtimate of things! ſo wonderfully are *Virtue* and *Self-Gratification* complicated together! I might add here, what has been already obſerved more at large, that the very Purſuit of Pleaſure itſelf in the Inſtances now ſuggeſted, in the ſeveral Objects of *Decency*, *Beauty*, and *Order*, is not

jection to it, " that it does not appear to be ſuch." It puts People upon acquiring *for themſelves* a comfortable or convenient Subſiſtence, which, becauſe it is the Reſult of their own Labour and Induſtry, they conſider as *a Reward not of Grace, but of Debt.* (Rom. 4. 4.) A very conſiderable Inhancement this of the Value of it! To be the Authors of our own Happineſs, being a much greater Pleaſure to us, than to receive the ſame Proportion of Good at the arbitrary Will of another.——We may add, that this is therefore the *trueſt kind* of Goodneſs, becauſe it is indeed the Method of the *Deity himſelf* to all his Creatures. He gives them the *Capacities* of Happineſs and of Virtue, and leaves the *actual Acquiſition* of *both* in a great meaſure to *themſelves*, that they may ſet the greater Value upon them.

only convertible in the Method already propoſed into an *actual Exerciſe* of Virtue, but moreover has a natural Tendency to carry us on to ſtill *higher Degrees* of it: it being ſcarce poſſible but that to a conſiderate Man the ſame Principle of *good Taſte* which regulates his *Amuſements* muſt irreſiſtibly make its way into the Oeconomy of his *Mind* and *Temper*; and lay the Foundations of ſolid *Worth* in his *inward* and *moral* Character *.

I am afraid, (interpoſed I) *Hortenſius*, this is too *liberal* a Method of Inſtruction, thus to recommend Virtue as the Perfection of good Taſte, and ſend us to the School of our moſt refined Pleaſures to learn it in, ever to paſs with our rigid Inſtructors in Morality for a *right* one: Impoſition, Command, and arbitrary Appointment are the Leſſons they chooſe to teach us; and indeed they are the only ones that can be at all fitted to introduce the Rigors of their extravagant Syſtems. Submiſſion and Reſtraint is with them all in all; and there is always the more of *Grace* in any Practice, the leſs there is of *Nature*. To cultivate a Taſte of moral Worth and Excellence from a Principle of

* See this Notion treated with the uſual Elegance of that noble Author, in the Characteriſtics, Vol. III. Miſcel. 3. Chap. 1, 2.

Decency,

Decency, *Proportion*, and *Beauty* in Actions, is a Piece of rank *philoſophic Pride*, rather than of *religious Humility*. Our Conduct is then moſt valuable in *itſelf*, when there is the leaſt Ground to think it ſo in *our* Apprehenſion of it. This *Pride* of Virtue is the *Ruin* of it; they can allow nothing to be ſuch, that flows from ſo corrupt a Principle.

YET the Principle of *Reverence to a Man's ſelf* * (returned *Hortenſius*) was thought fit to be inculcated by one of the wiſeſt Moraliſts of Antiquity; and it will ever be a very juſt Foundation of moral Merit, in ſpight of all the viſionary Conceits of ſpiritual Mortification. Pride, *Philemon*, is one of thoſe Qualities in our Nature that is either *good* or *bad*, according as it is applied. To be *proud* of, or *approve* in ourſelves, what is really excellent, is only to form a *true Eſtimate* of things: and can there be any Merit, as Mr. *Norris*, I remember, ſomewhere obſerves, in *being miſtaken* †? 'Tis then only wrong, when it is placed upon wrong Objects; when

* Παντων δε μαλις-α αισχυνεω σ'αυτου,
Was one of the capital Precepts of *Pythagoras*'s Morals, and perhaps (ſays Mr. *Norris*) one of the beſt too that ever was given to the World. *Nor.* Miſcel. 8vo. 351.

† *Nor.* as above, p. 346.

we

we conceit ourſelves of imaginary Worth, and neglect what is real and genuine. If it be ſaid that every Degree of Pride is criminal in the preſent imperfect State of human Nature, what is this but to ſay that it is impoſſible for Man to arrive at *any Degree* of moral Worth? an Opinion which, as *fallen* as he is repreſented to be, cannot be maintained without a manifeſt *Diſhonour* to his Maker. But to ſtate this Matter yet more clearly——If *Compulſion* be of the Eſſence of Virtue, as it is inſinuated in the Objection you mention, the Conduct of the ſupreme Being himſelf has much leſs *Merit* in it than that of the moſt *diſingenuous* of his Creatures; otherwiſe, what is a Perfection in the Deity, cannot but be ſuch in Man too, as far as he is able to imitate it. Now to practiſe Virtue, the *higheſt* Degrees of Virtue, without *Conſtraint*; to purſue it upon a Principle of *free Choice*, for the *mere Pleaſure* and Approbation of the thing itſelf, as his *Glory*, and his *Happineſs*, is what conſtitutes our Idea of the *divine Perfection*: and ſhall the ſame thing which gives ſuch a ſuperlative *Grace* and *Luſtre* to the *divine Character*, caſt a *Shade* upon the *human*? So that after all, *Philemon*, Conſtraint and Self-Denial is ſo far from being *neceſſary* to Virtue, that 'tis mere *Weakneſs* and *Want* of Virtue that gives *them* either Uſe or Expediency.

pediency. They are a *Derogation* from the true Merit of Virtue, as *far* as they are ſhewn to take place in it: and the *higheſt* State of moral Excellence is that where there is nothing of *Diſſatisfaction*, nothing of *Difficulty*; where Virtue is, as it ever ought to be, a Service of *perfect Freedom*, *generous Affection*, and *unallayed Complacency*. But this perhaps may be thought refining.—Enough however has been argued from other leſs abſtracted Topics to eſtabliſh this general Concluſion upon the whole, " that however the " Purſuits of *Pleaſure* and *Virtue* are " often repreſented as *inconſiſtent*, the *na-* " *tural* Conſtitution of things, a moſt " certain Teſtimony of the *Intention* of " their *Author*, is ſuch as never can be re- " conciled with this gloomy Principle." Providence, which does nothing in vain, would not have ſo exquiſitely adapted the Works of his hands to the Entertainment and Service of Man, if Miſery of any kind had been his determined Portion and Aſſignment in the preſent Life. The Diſcipline of Virtue is then an *eaſy* and a *liberal* Diſcipline. They are Strangers to the *lovely Form*, who repreſent her to our view with a forbidding Aſpect, with nothing but Clouds and Frowns upon her Brow. The Practice of our Duty is in the ſtricteſt Senſe to *follow Nature*: and

the

the way to recommend ourſelves to a kind and good Deity is not to *haraſs* and *afflict* that Being he has in his gracious Bounty beſtowed upon us; but, upon a rational and judicious Eſtimate of things, to conſult in the moſt effectual manner at once the greateſt *Eaſe*, *Happineſs*, and *Improvement* of it. How different, *Philemon*, has been the *general Turn* of Religion in the World!

You promiſed, (ſaid I) *Hortenſius*, to give me ſome Account of this Matter: but we have dwelt ſo long upon ſome previous Points, that we are got, I perceive, almoſt to the End of our Walk; and the Evening is too far advanced upon us to think of ſtaying abroad any longer.———I hope, however, you will be as good as your word at ſome other Opportunity.

Whenever you pleaſe to call upon me, (returned he) I ſhall be ready to anſwer my Ingagement. We have eſtabliſhed a good general Foundation to proceed upon in this Queſtion; and may reſerve the farther Diſcuſſion of it to our future Leiſure or Inclination.

And thus, my *Hydaſpes*, I have brought you to a very commodious Reſting-Place in this Argument: and ſhall accordingly take

take my leave of you for the preſent; with a Promiſe of continuing my Report of our farther Conference, if you ſhall think it worth your while to require it of me.

FINIS.

Miſtakes of the Preſs.

Page 16, in the Note, χαχια for Κακια—p. 27, in the Note, line 5, *ordinum* for *ordinem*—p. 44, in the Note, l. 15, γης for της γης. Alſo l. 19, *Jovian* for *Jovinian*.—p. 45, in the Note, l. 9. ουτοι for ὁυτοι—p. 53, l. 8. *further* for *farther*.

4 JU 62